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Abstract
This Article facilitates just such an inquiry by tracking the progression of pretrial provisional
release at the ICTY. This Article first considers pretrial release (or release pursuant to bail) in the
abstract along with those rights that may theoretically be implicated by an act of pretrial detention.
It then examines the relevant activity of the ICTY’s predecessors, interim advancements in human
rights law and the absence of a release-based statutory provision at the Yugoslav Tribunal. The
applicable rule adopted by the ICTY is then assessed, along with subsequent amendments. At each
stage, specific regard is given to the rights affected by the approaches that govern the release of
detainees. In brief, this work comprehensively vets the legitimacy of ICTY practice in the context
of pretrial release and questions its precedential value by noting instances of internal inconsistency,
misleading pronouncements, and often sharp variances with international standards.
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2009, a single judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II at the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) granted the interim 
release of alleged warlord Jean-Pierre Bemba.1 The decision 
turned heads around the world, as Bemba was then poised to 
become the first accused in ICC custody to be awarded pretrial 
release.2 In support of this noteworthy decision, the single judge 
remarkably availed herself of the jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia3 
(“ICTY” or the “Yugoslav Tribunal”), an approach that is not 
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1. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Interim 
Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 77 (Aug. 14, 2009). 
2. E.g., PhD Studies in Human Rights, 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/ (Aug. 15, 2009, 11:18) (describing the 
decision as “a generous one, that sits on the fault line of the fundamental rights of the 
defendant and the imperatives of international justice.”). The prosecutor’s subsequent 
appeal of the release decision was granted suspensive effect. Bemba, Decision on the 
Request of the Prosecutor for Suspensive Effect, ¶ 15 (Sept. 3, 2009). The decision to 
release Bemba was later reversed on several bases, including that there was no statutory 
change in circumstances that necessitated the release. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 
OA2, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor (Dec. 2, 2009). 
3. Bemba, Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 72, 88. 
For the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”), see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter 
ICTY Statute]. 
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unique in the context of release determinations at the ICC.4 This 
method of operation underscores the value of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal’s experience to the practice of present day international 
criminal justice institutions.5 This potentially powerful influence 
of ICTY practice upon a growing field of courts and tribunals6 
makes it timely to question whether the work of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal with regard to its pretrial release scheme provides a 
framework that is worthy of replication. 
This Article facilitates just such an inquiry by tracking the 
progression of pretrial provisional release at the ICTY.7 This 
 
4. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubango-Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on 
the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubango-Dyilo Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
¶¶ 123, 126 (Feb. 13, 2007); Bemba, Public Decision on Application for Interim Release, 
¶ 49 (Apr. 14, 2009). 
5. The practice of “mining” ICTY precedent “by more recently established courts 
for ‘best practices’ replication,” is an ongoing one. Patricia M. Wald, Tribunal Discourse 
and Intercourse: How the International Courts Speak to One Another, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 15, 20 (2007); see also, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 44 (2006) 
(remarking upon the legacy of the work of the ICTY and its sister court, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and noting that “the case law of 
the international criminal tribunals will provide immense guidance to the International 
Criminal Court”). The ICTR was established under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by 
the ICTR reflect those of the ICTY mutatis mutandis. Id. art. 14. Accordingly, the 
framework and practice of the ICTR closely tracks that of the ICTY. 
6. These include the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Agreement Between the 
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Jun. 6, 2003, 2329 
U.N.T.S. 117. As noted by one prominent international jurist, 
Beyond the various areas of international law, international humanitarian law, 
and international criminal law and procedure that have benefited from the 
ICTY’s rich legacy, it should be noted that even the recently established 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia, a hybrid institution 
essentially within the Cambodian domestic legal system, cites the case law of 
the ICTY in matters of procedure and fairness. 
Fausto Pocar, Completion or Continuation Strategy? Appraising Problems and Possible 
Developments in Building the Legacy of the ICTY. 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 655, 662 (2008) 
(citing Prosecutor v. Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Decision on 
Appeal against Provisional Detention Order of Nuon Chea (March 20, 2008)). 
7. Although provisional release at the ICTY is available in other contexts, such as 
release throughout the course of trial proceedings or during the appeal process after 
conviction, this Article does not substantively engage with these aspects of ICTY practice. 
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Article first considers pretrial release (or release pursuant to bail) 
in the abstract along with those rights that may theoretically be 
implicated by an act of pretrial detention. It then examines the 
relevant activity of the ICTY’s predecessors, interim 
advancements in human rights law and the absence of a release-
based statutory provision at the Yugoslav Tribunal. The 
applicable rule adopted by the ICTY is then assessed, along with 
subsequent amendments. At each stage, specific regard is given 
to the rights affected by the approaches that govern the release 
of detainees. In brief, this work comprehensively vets the 
legitimacy of ICTY practice in the context of pretrial release and 
questions its precedential value by noting instances of internal 
inconsistency, misleading pronouncements, and often sharp 
variances with international standards. 
I. IS THERE A “FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BAIL”? 
In order to properly evaluate the activity of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal in the area of pretrial release, it is essential to first 
determine those rights implicated by pretrial detention and the 
relevant standards associated therewith. As a general starting 
point, courts and academics often speak of a “fundamental right 
to bail.”8 This is a phrase repeated often enough so as to 
necessitate close consideration. In short, the core question is 
whether there is authority to support the assertion that accused 
persons are entitled to an opportunity for release. Even if one 
accepts the proposition that under “general principles of law, 
custody pending trial shall be regarded as an exceptional 
measure,”9 the question remains whether the right to bail may be 
deemed to exist in and of itself. 
 
8. See, e.g., Augustus v. Roemer, 771 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (E.D. La. 1991) (averring 
that, in the United States, there is a “limited fundamental right to bail” that entails “fair 
access to the bail system to those who . . . qualify for pretrial release”); Kurt X. 
Metzmeier, Preventive Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, 
England, Canada and Other Common Law Nations, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 399, 400 n.3 
(1996). U.S. Ambassador David J. Scheffer includes the right to “provisional release 
pending trial” in his list of hard fought due process rights presently denied to terror 
suspects. Advancing U.S. Interests with the International Criminal Court, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1567, 1571 (2003). 
9. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Mutual 
Recognition of Non-Custodial Pre-Trial Supervision Measures 3, COM (2004) 562 final 
(Aug. 17, 2004). If this is, in fact the case, as will be seen infra, the ICTY’s approach to 
provisional release stands somewhat at odds with the its judiciary’s asserted attempt, in 
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To engage in a debate on the issue of whether bail is a 
“fundamental” right is seemingly to reject the assertion that 
there is no hierarchy among international human rights. By its 
very nature, attempting to delineate such an order presents its 
own challenge because, as Meron points out, “the lack of 
generally agreed standards makes it extremely difficult to select 
such fundamental rights.”10 As “international guarantees” are 
relatively novel creations when considered alongside their 
domestic counterparts, one might be inclined to search for an 
analog in the domestic realm, where such rights have assumed a 
place in relevant constitutions for centuries.11 There, too, 
however, one finds that those attributes that elevate a right to 
attain fundamental status are difficult to discern. For example, 
what can be gleaned from the assertion that “fundamental 
rights” can be distinguished from other rights owing to the fact 
that the former are rights “in the strong sense”?12 Indeed, in the 
United States alone, the term “fundamental right” enjoys several 
distinct definitions.13 
Fortunately, the question posed regarding a right to bail is 
more basic than this type of analysis. Of concern here is not 
whether the right to bail enjoys some type of heightened status, 
 
drafting the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to “reflect[ ] concepts that are 
generally recognized as being fair and just in the international arena.” The Secretary-
General, Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, ¶ 53, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (Aug. 29, 1994) [hereinafter First Annual Report of the ICTY]. 
10. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1, 6 (1986). 
11. Dietrich Schindler, The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human 
Rights, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, Jan.–Feb. 1979, at 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/
Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList141/B680303DCEAF5E06C1256B6600590D7A (noting 
that “today the constitutional law of every country contains such guarantees”). 
12. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190 (1977). Dworkin, of course, 
elaborates upon what is meant by the use of this term and this work’s reference to it is 
not meant to undermine the value of that author’s contribution to constitutional 
discourse. Rather, the aim is to illustrate that, despite the usefulness of such elaboration, 
the term itself remains amorphous and, thereby, elusive. Id. 
13. See, e.g., W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg’s Charge that the Constitution is 
“Skimpy” in Comparison to our International Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental Rights in 
American and Foreign Law, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 951, 954–55 (1998) (observing that such 
rights have been described in many ways including “essential to individual liberty”, 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “rights deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s 
history and tradition” and lamenting the fact that “there is no perfect definition” 
(citations omitted)). 
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but rather whether it exists as an enforceable right on its own. 
This inquiry accepts the fact that bail plays a role in many 
municipalities and that its existence is recognized on an 
international level. It then considers whether bail or release is a 
standalone right or, in the alternative, it exists as a mechanism 
that buttresses or ensures the enforcement of a widely recognized 
right or group of rights. 
A foray into the realm of municipal constitutions is arguably 
instructive when it comes to making this determination. In this 
respect, it is remarkable that Bassiouni’s seminal comparative 
work on national constitutions makes no mention of the right to 
bail or pretrial release.14 Rather, Bassiouni’s test15 seems to 
militate against the assertion that there is a right to bail. By 
contrast, related rights, which will be considered in turn, appear 
in a multitude of national constitutions. For example, the right to 
be presumed innocent, dubbed by Bassiouni as “inextricably 
linked to fairness in criminal due process,” can be found in more 
than sixty-seven national constitutions.16 In addition, the right to 
liberty or freedom, while admittedly not a right that derives from 
any instrument,17 is expressly embodied in sixteen national 
instruments and exceptions to the right to liberty are delineated 
in 119 constitutions in provisions that prohibit arbitrary arrest 
and detention.18 Similarly, liberty interests are also protected by 
constitutional guarantees of trial without undue delay, a right 
 
14. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 285 (1993). Moreover, even when access to bail is 
facilitated by a constitutional provision, this does not necessarily give rise to the 
existence of bail as a right. See, e.g.., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) 
(“The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that 
‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.’ This clause, of course, says nothing about 
whether bail shall be available at all.”). 
15. Bassiouni, supra note 14, at 239–40 (dictating that a general principle derives 
from instrument recognition of a right on both the national and international level). 
16. Id. at 267 (observing that other constitutions, such as that of Ethiopia, employ 
the more restrictive guarantee that an accused will not be presumed guilty). 
17. As Justice Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court notes, this would make all persons 
“creatures of the state.” Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). To the contrary, for all persons, liberty is a “cardinal unalienable right” and 
“relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to 
infringe on the liberty of the citizen.” Id. 
18. See Bassiouni, supra note 14, at 256–57 (noting that the right to inviolability of 
the person, which can be deemed to incorporate the rights to life, liberty and security of 
the person, can be found in thirteen additional constitutions). 
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that can be found in forty-three domestic instruments.19 It is, 
therefore, within this fluid milieu that the pretrial right to bail, or 
release, will be evaluated, considering the right, first and 
foremost, within the context of the right to liberty.  
A. Right to Liberty 
Examined carefully, the assertion that bail is a fundamental 
right is potentially misleading. It is beyond dispute that access to 
bail may be a statutory20 or constitutional entitlement.21 But, 
considered in a holistic sense, what is the real right at issue? Is 
not the heart of the matter whether an accused may secure and 
enjoy his liberty interests? Considered in this light, the concept of 
bail can be seen not as the “right” it is generally assumed to be 
but, conversely, as a mechanism by which a state may qualify the 
liberty interests of an accused person. Viewing bail in this light 
does not overlook the fact that bail can inure to the benefit of an 
accused; it is clear that the opportunity to utilize the mechanism 
provides a far more attractive alternative than the forfeiture of 
one’s freedom. 
The distinction regarding the manner in which the issue of 
release is considered is of seminal importance. If one deems 
release to be “the right at stake,” the right may well be viewed too 
narrowly and an ensuing analysis may, in turn, fail to conform to 
established standards.22 Thus, the inquiry needs to be 
approached from the perspective that it is a liberty interest that 
lies at the heart of the bail-release equation. From there, it 
 
19. See id. at 285. 
20. See, e.g., The Bail Act, 1976, c.63, s.4 (Eng.). 
21. See, e.g., CONST. art. 21 (Liber.) (“All accused persons shall be bailable upon 
their personal recognizance or by sufficient sureties . . . .”); CONST. art. 24 (Uganda) 
(providing that an accused is entitled to apply to be released on bail, that release on bail 
is required when the relevant trial has yet to occur and an accused has been remanded 
for a period of 120 days (in the case of lesser offenses) or 360 days), reprinted in A 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO UGANDA’S FOURTH CONSTITUTION (D. Mukholi ed. 1995). Equally, 
constitutional provisions can serve to authorize limitations on the right to bail. See, e.g., 
Ir. CONST., 1937, art 40 (sanctioning laws that provide for the refusal of bail under 
certain circumstances). 
22. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 341, 345–56 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (rebuking the majority for narrowly reading the right in question to be one 
involving “some insubstantial and non-fundamental right to be released” rather than 
“the right to be free from governmental confinement” and noting that this approach 
enabled the majority to violate the constitutional principle that the government bears 
the burden of proving that detention is necessary). 
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should be accepted as a necessary premise that an individual’s 
liberty interests are not absolute and that entitlement to pretrial 
release may be conditioned upon the provision of some sort of 
guarantee or security. 
Moreover, the connection between bail and the right to 
liberty of person is expressly recognized in international and 
regional human rights instruments. The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) addresses the issue of 
pretrial detention under the heading of “Liberty and Security of 
Person”23 as does the European24 and American25 conventions on 
Human Rights (respectively, “ECHR” and “ACHR”). In a 
manner akin to the domestic documents that preceded them, 
these instruments do not present personal liberty as an inviolable 
right,26 but rather guard against certain encroachments on that 
right. In this regard, as Nowak notes, the human right of 
personal liberty is a procedural guarantee which requires that, in 
order to guard against arbitrary and unlawful detention, 
legislation “define precisely the cases in which deprivation of 
liberty is permissible.”27 
 
23. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights art. 9(3), Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 95-29 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“It shall not be 
the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody . . . .”). 
24. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 5(3), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
25. American Convention on Human Rights art. 7(5), July 18, 1978, S. DOC. NO. 
95-2 (1978), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]. The African (Banjul) Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights is less specific regarding pretrial release. The charter asserts 
the right to liberty of person and prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention as well as ex 
post facto laws that result in the deprivation of freedom. It also dictates that trials be 
held within a reasonable time, but makes no mention of release. African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights arts. 6, 7, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. However, a 
subsequent resolution issued by the African Commission interpreted article 7 to require 
that an accused be “tri[ed] within a reasonable time or be released.” Afr. Comm’n on 
Human and Peoples' Rights Res. 4(XI)92, ¶ 2(c), OAU Doc. ACHPR/Res.4(XI)92 (Mar. 
9, 1992). 
26. The Magna Carta, for example, is often cited as one of the earliest instruments 
to recognize personal liberty interests. It does this repeatedly, but only insofar as it calls 
for due process and condemns the deprivation of liberty interests in the absence of a 
lawful judgment. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive 
Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 585, 597 (2009). 
27. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR 
COMMENTARY 211–12 (2d ed. 2005). 
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B. Detention as an Exceptional Measure 
Notably, the plain language regarding release, as set out in 
all three of the instruments noted above, could give rise to the 
argument that a right to release exists solely as part of an 
“either/or” proposition: all three documents appear to describe 
release as a mutually exclusive alternative to “trial within a 
reasonable time.”28 Despite this possibility, jurisprudential 
interpretation of the European provision has proved more 
generous than an ordinary meaning analysis.29 Moreover, the 
language that comprises the relevant subarticle in the ICCPR is 
more expansive than its regional counterparts in that it also 
affirmatively recognizes that “it shall not be the general rule that 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody.”30 Merely 
because this sentiment appears in just one of the three 
documents does not discredit its import; the ICCPR is “the most 
useful as the product of long deliberation by a wide cross-section 
of States.”31 Notably, this avowed preference for release, in 
conjunction with the phrase that follows it, was acknowledged by 
its creators as one that “implicitly concede[s] . . . the right of a 
person charged with an offence to be released on bail.”32 This 
represented a strong step forward from a human rights 
perspective as, at the time of the final draft in 1958, the right to 
pretrial release was not universally recognized.33 
 
28. ACHR, supra note 25, art. 7(5) (“Any person detained . . . shall be entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of 
the proceedings.”); ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 9(3) (providing that “Anyone arrested . . . 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release”); ECHR, supra note 24, 
art. 5(3) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrest or detention and providing that 
persons so held are entitled to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial). 
29. E.g., Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37 (1968) (determining 
that the relevant “provision does not give the judicial authorities a choice between 
either bringing the accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional 
release—even subject to guarantees”). 
30. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 9(3); see also Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-
01/05-01/08, Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 36 (Aug. 
14, 2009) (“[D]eprivation of liberty should be an exception and not a rule.”). 
31. David Harris, The Right to a Fair Trial as a Human Right, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
352, 353 (1967). 
32. Report of the 3rd Committee of the General Assembly § 56, 1958 Y.B. on H.R. 205, 
U.N. Doc. A/4045 [hereinafter Report of the 3rd Comm.]; see NOWAK, supra note 27, at 234 
(remarking that the provision gives rise to an “‘indirect entitlement to release from pretrial 
detention in exchange for bail or some other guarantee”). 
33. Report of the 3rd Comm., supra note 32, § 56. 
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C. Presumption of Innocence 
In addition, the presumption of innocence, one of the core 
components of due process,34 assumes an important role in 
relation to pretrial release. The right to interim release has been 
regarded as “an accoutrement of the presumption of 
innocence,”35 a “method of accommodating” the principle,36 and 
a “manifestation” of the presumption.37 The connection between 
these two concepts is, of course, very fitting: if a person is 
presumed innocent with regard to the charges filed against him, 
why should he be required to forfeit his liberty interests prior to 
conviction?38 
1. Pretrial Applicability 
One cannot assume, however, that a presumption of 
innocence will necessarily be applied in the pretrial stages. For 
some, the presumption of innocence is neither so broad in scope 
nor so far-reaching in its effect. In this vein, the argument has 
been advanced that the presumption is an evidentiary principle, 
and, as such, should be limited to the trial phase. From this 
perspective, the presumption “does not mean that those who 
discharge executive or administrative functions prior to trial 
should be bound to act as though the suspect had behaved, and 
would, pending trial, behave as a law-abiding citizen.”39 Given 
that opinions on the matter are not uniform, it may be helpful to 
turn to the history of bail, keeping in mind the presumption of 
innocence particularly, and to monitor its evolution in that vein. 
 
34. See id. (“The principle of the presumption of innocence was considered so 
important that it was thought advisable to express it [in the ICCPR] in a separate 
paragraph.”) 
35. Patricia Wald & Jenny Martinez, Provisional Release and the ICTY: A Work in 
Progress, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK 
MCDONALD 231, 231 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001). 
36. Re S, (2005) 157 A. Crim R. 451, 452 (Austl.). 
37. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 95 (2d ed. 2004). 
38. As one author recognizes, “[I]f the presumption of innocence is to have 
substantive meaning, the scope and cost of pretrial sanctioning should be minimized for 
the maximum number of defendants.” ROY B. FLEMMING, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF FELONY BAIL PROCESSES 2 (1982). 
39. T.B. Smith, Scotland: Bail Before Trial: Reflections of a Scottish Lawyer, 108 U. PA. L. 
REV. 305, 309 (1959) (emphasis added). 
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The opportunity for pretrial release finds its roots in the 
common law and can be traced back to at least the eleventh 
century.40 Yet whether its construction can be attributed in any 
meaningful way to the presumption of innocence is far from 
clear. At the time that bail was established, England’s system of 
justice was rudimentary at best and accused individuals faced 
lengthy periods of incarceration prior to the resolution of the 
charges against them.41 This is the rationale that provided for the 
inception of bail, as reported by Sir James Stephen in his 
influential nineteenth-century work on the history of criminal law 
in England.42 Whether the presumption of innocence principle 
had a place in English law at that time is uncertain.43 
Nevertheless, at least one court has interpreted Stephen’s 
account of bail’s formation as owing to the presumption of 
innocence.44 
To be fair, a trace of the “golden thread” is arguably implicit 
in Stephen’s observation that, in the absence of an opportunity 
for release, “arrest meant imprisonment without preliminary 
 
40. See, e.g., JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 234 (London, MacMillan 1883) (tracing the history of the law of bail to the 
onset of the reign of King Edward I). 
41. Id. at 233. Stephen writes: 
When the administration of justice was in its infancy, arrest meant 
imprisonment without preliminary inquiry till the sheriff held his tourn at 
least, and, in more serious cases, till the arrival of the justices, which might be 
delayed for years, and it was therefore of the utmost importance to be able to 
obtain provisional release from custody. 
Id. 
42. Id. 233–34; cf, Smith, supra note 39, at 309 (asserting that “[t]he considerations 
which would justify the granting or refusing of bail in the 20th century are not 
necessarily identical with those of the 18th century when executive and judicial 
arrangements were less efficient, and when prison conditions in general were 
appalling”). 
43. The origin of the presumption is a matter of debate among scholars and may 
be discerned by numerous mechanisms. For a discussion on the issue, along with an 
assertion that the presumption was created and developed “‘in two parallel and 
independent routes in continental Europe and Anglo-American law,” see Rinat Kitai, 
Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 259–63 (2002). 
44. See Webster v. S. Austl. (2003) 87 S.A. St. R. 17, 37. That Stephen himself would 
not draw the same conclusion seems plain; his limited commentary on the presumption 
of innocence reveals that he subscribed to the narrow view of the principle noted above. 
He attributes the creation of the presumption as owing, “to a considerable extent, [to] 
the extreme severity of the old criminal law, and even more to the capriciousness of its 
severity and the element of chance . . . introduced into its administration.” STEPHEN, 
supra note 40, at 439. 
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inquiry,”45 or perhaps might be inferred from the practice of 
release itself.46 However a correlation between bail and the 
presumption of innocence is seemingly refuted in later Scottish 
jurisprudence. In H.M. Advocate v. M’Glinchey, a 1921 case that 
reached Scotland’s High Court of Justiciary, the court attributes 
the creation of bail to the fact that, prior to its inception, accused 
persons “had no efficient protection against prolonged 
incarceration before their case was brought to trial.”47 Perhaps as 
a consequence of its perception of pretrial release as conceived 
solely to avoid prolonged pretrial imprisonment, that court 
opted “not to treat the matter as a question of [the] presumption 
[of innocence]” in rendering its bail determination.48 
A subsequent Scottish case cited M’Glichney with approval to 
reject the proposition that the presumption of innocence plays a 
role in bail determinations. As an absolute application of the 
presumption would necessitate that every accused be afforded 
pretrial release, the Scottish High Court found no place for it in 
matters of granting bail.49 Yet, as time passed and the right to a 
fair trial evolved,50 so too did the assessment of release 
applications. While acknowledging that an absolutist view of the 
presumption of innocence would obviate the need for bail 
determinations, subsequent Scottish jurisprudence recognized 
the presumption as “one of the competing factors” in 
considering release,51 an approach mirrored in present day 
assessments by English courts.52 
 
45. STEPHEN, supra note 40, at 233. 
46. Indeed, one academic avers that the presumption of innocence can found in 
ancient Hebrew law, citing the fact that the presumption was embodied in the then 
applicable law of detention, although “‘not referred to specifically.”‘ Kitai, supra note 
43, at 261 & n.17. 
47. H.M. Advocate v. M’Glinchey, 1921 J.C. 75 (Scot.). 
48. Id. at 102. 
49. McLeod v. Wright, [1959] J.C. 12, 14 (Scot.). Of course, the chink in the armor 
of this argument ought to be somewhat readily apparent: the same rationale could 
equally be called upon to obviate the need for pretrial investigations and, indeed, trial 
proceedings themselves. The end result of interpreting the presumption in such a way 
would, in effect, negate the possibility of criminal proceedings in their entirety. Indeed, 
“[p]rohibiting an investigation and trial because the guilt of the accused has not yet 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt would prevent any possibility of refuting the 
presumption of innocence and enforcing the criminal law.” Kitai, supra note 43, at 289. 
50. See generally Harris, supra note 31. 
51. Smith v. M, 1982 J.C. 67, 69. 
52. See, e.g., R. v. Crown Court at Harrow [2003] EWHC 868, aff’d [2006] UKHL 
42,[2007] 1 A.C. 249 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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In what can only be dubbed a counter-trend, however, the 
concept of the nonexistence of the presumption in the pretrial 
phase remains alive and well in the domestic jurisprudence of the 
United States. Indeed, even as continental systems—long known 
for limiting the application of the principle to trial53—have 
begun to take a more expansive view of the presumption,54 the 
U.S. Supreme Court has averred that the principle “has no 
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee 
during confinement before his trial has even begun.”55 This 
paradigm (backward) shift in U.S. jurisprudence is one that 
rightly was interpreted as setting the stage for a “substantial 
inversion” of the presumption of innocence.56 As a result, the 
United States subsequently set in place a bail act deemed by the 
late Justice Marshall as “an abhorrent limitation on the 
presumption of innocence”57—an act that has fostered an 
abundance of scholarly58 and media criticism.59 
Illustrative of the fact that this narrow interpretation has not 
gone entirely out of style in jurisdictions other than the United 
 
53. “While many, if not most, of the civil law countries provide for the principle of 
the presumption of innocence, they limit its application to protection for the accused at 
trial.” Louis M. Natali, Jr. & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Redrafting the Due Process Model: The 
Preventive Detention Blueprint, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 1225, 1228–29 & n.26 (1989) (citing the 
1964 codification of C. PR. PÉN. art. 137–50 (Fr.)). 
54. As of 2000, article 137 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure specifically 
cites the pretrial applicability of the presumption of innocence: 
La personne mise en examen, présumée innocente, reste libre. Toutefois, en raison des 
nécessités de l’instruction ou à titre de mesure de sûreté, elle peut être astreinte à une ou 
plusieurs obligations du contrôle judiciaire. Lorsque celles-ci se révèlent insuffisantes au 
regard de ces objectifs, elle peut, à titre exceptionnel, être placée en détention provisoire. 
C. PR. PÈN art 137 (2000). It has also recently been argued that, from a continental 
perspective, the presumption can be deemed a vital aspect of the pretrial stage as it may 
be interpreted as mandating a thorough and neutral enquiry. Jacqueline Hodgson, 
Suspects, Defendants and Victims in the French Criminal Process: The Context of Recent Reform, 
51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 781, 791 (2002). 
55. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
56. Jean Koh Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Substantial Transformation of Judicial 
Precedent, 31 B.C. L. REV. 641, 692 (1990) (maintaining that the “logical extension of the 
current trend leads to a system in which wrongly detained, unconvicted defendants will 
suffer a significant loss of liberty until proven innocent”). 
57. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 761–64 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
58. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 56; M. Gray Styers, United States v. Salerno: Pretrial 
Detention Seen Through the Looking Glass, 66 N.C. L. REV. 616 (1988); LeRoy Pernell, The 
Reign of the Queen of Hearts: The Declining Significance of the Presumption of Innocence—A 
Brief Commentary, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 393 (1989). 
59. See, e.g., Dangerous Until Proven Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1987, at A22; Made 
in Which USA?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), May 30, 1987, at 14A. 
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States, however, numerous observers, and evidentiary scholars in 
particular, have equated the principle solely with the burden of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.60 A similar argument 
was somewhat recently advanced by a respondent state before the 
European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”).61 
Although the European Court did not entertain the assertion, it 
is likely safe to conclude that such an approach would not be 
endorsed, as that court has repeatedly recognized the relevance 
of the principle in its assessment of pretrial detention.62 In fact, 
the presumption of innocence has been dubbed the “Strasbourg 
starting-point” when bail determinations are at issue.63 
Indeed, this approach is the proper one, recognizing the 
fact that, regardless of the thoughts that accompanied bail’s 
creation, the presumption of innocence has come to be the 
“raison d’être” of the right to pretrial release.64 Moreover, to 
disregard the presumption in the pretrial phase is to eliminate, at 
a crucial stage, a guiding principle designed to secure a necessary 
level of political morality and protection of human dignity.65 
Viewed in this manner, a comprehensive rather than constricted 
interpretation of the principle is called for, ensuring that the 
application of the presumption in later stages of the criminal 
 
60. See Kitai, supra note 43, at 258 n.11. Indeed, Cassese asserts that the 
presumption’s principal meaning relates to the prosecutorial assignment of the burden 
of proof in criminal trials and, frequently, the standard of proof that must be met in 
fulfilling that burden and that the principle only “generally impl[ies] that an accused 
should remain at liberty unless and until he is convicted . . . .” Antonio Cassese, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Human Rights, 4 EUR. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 329, 334 (1997). 
61. See the arguments of (ironically) the British government as noted in Togher v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 28555/95, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99 (1998), reprinted in 1998 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 636. 
62. For example, the court has observed that, in determining whether the pretrial 
detention of an accused person has exceeded a reasonable time, national judicial 
authorities “must examine all the circumstances arguing for or against the existence of a 
genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the 
presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty . . . .” 
Clooth v. Belgium, 225 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 12 (1991) (emphasis added); see also 
Kemmache v. France, 218 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 20 (1991); Calleja v. Malta, App. No. 
75274/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 99 (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/
hudoc. 
63. Ian Dennis, Bail and Human Rights, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 69, 69 (2000) (assigning 
the same prominence to the right to liberty). 
64. See Canadian Supreme Court in R v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 370, 2002 SCC 
64, at [96] (Iacobucci et al., dissenting). 
65. Kitai, supra note 43, at 272–73. 
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process is neither compromised nor undermined by the 
treatment that has taken place beforehand.66 Accordingly, the 
U.S. Supreme Court lost its way on this matter under the 
Rehnquist Court, having earlier gotten the issue right in regards 
to access to pretrial release and the presumption: 
This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits 
the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to 
prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction . . . . 
Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the 
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of 
struggle, would lose its meaning.67 
2. Presumption of Innocence and Bail Jurisprudence 
Accepting, then, the pretrial applicability of the 
presumption of innocence, and noting its consequent 
relationship with pretrial release, one would assume that an 
evaluation of the presumption would serve as the backbone of 
the assessment undertaken in this Article. Yet, from a 
jurisprudential standpoint, relevant case law is far from 
abundant; this is partially explained by Nowak’s apt observation 
that “allegations of a violation of the right to be presumed 
innocent are . . . difficult to prove in practice.”68 
Another complication is that the presumption of innocence 
exists not only as a singular right, but also as a catalyst for a 
number of other aspects of a fair trial.69 As such, it is likely to be 
 
66. See, e.g., SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 84–85 (2003) (advocating for the broad application of the presumption, 
covering all situations in the criminal process, including the investigatory (precharge) 
phase and averring that the principle “should affect the overall treatment of the 
individual”). 
67. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). 
68. NOWAK, supra note 27, at 331. A rare exception to this remark can be seen in a 
case brought before the European Court of Human Rights in which two accused 
successfully waged claims asserting a violation of the presumption of innocence. The 
men, although acquitted, were denied compensation for their pretrial detention on the 
basis that they would have been convicted had their indictments included a lesser, 
related charge. Del Latte v. Netherlands, App. No. 44760/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 176 
(2005); see also Sekanina v. Austria, 266 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
69. See U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], General Comment No. 13: Equality Before 
the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established by 
Law (Art.14), at 143, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Add.3 (Apr. 13, 1984) (commenting that 
the presumption of innocence dictates that “[n]o guilt can be presumed until [a] 
charge has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt” and that “the presumption . . . 
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considered in conjunction with, or in part affecting, an 
alternative right. In this regard, the general rule of release 
required by ICCPR article 9(3) is seen as “articulating” the 
presumption by casting pretrial release as the norm70 and, 
indicative of the fluid relationship between the two rights, the 
presumption has been deemed to generally embody the right to 
liberty.71 
At the same time, regional case law has rightly recognized 
that the presumption of innocence may well be inverted in cases 
of unreasonably prolonged pretrial detention. For instance, the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has found that the 
presumption “becomes increasingly empty and ultimately a 
mockery when pretrial imprisonment is prolonged 
unreasonably.”72 This same position was later endorsed by the 
Human Rights Committee. In in Cagas v. Philippines, the 
Committee stated that excessive pretrial detention affects the 
right to be presumed innocent and found a violation of the right 
because the accused had endured a period of pretrial detention 
that lasted for nine years.73 
While the Committee did not elaborate upon its conclusion, 
it remains a beneficial exercise to consider why the presumption 
of innocence is affronted in such a case and, correspondingly, 
why similar violations are absent in periods of shorter pretrial 
detention. Put differently, the query raised relates to the manner 
in which the varying temporal element sets the two types of cases 
apart. Possibly, it is the sheer fact that extended periods of 
incarceration simply fail to rest comfortably alongside the notion 
 
implies a right to be treated in accordance with this principle.” (emphasis added)), reprinted in 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, at 184, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9(Vol.I); see also DOMINIC 
MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 405 (1994) (“This broad 
approach to the presumption of innocence is to be welcomed . . . .”). 
70. Human Rights Watch, Excessive Pretrial Detention, http://www.hrw.org/
legacy/advocacy/prisons/pretrial.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
71. See R v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, at [48] (Can.). 
72. Giminez v. Argentina, Case 11.245, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/96, 
EA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 14 ¶ 80 (1996). 
73. HRC, Communication No. 788/1997: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Cagas v. Philippines), ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997 (Jan. 
31, 2002) (specifying that it was the length of incarceration, rather than the initial denial 
of bail, that violated the presumption). 
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of presumed innocence—to claim the latter in the face of the 
former simply fails to pass the “straight face test.” Alternatively, 
perhaps it is the fact that, regardless of claims to the contrary, 
longer-term incarceration invariably crosses the line from an 
administrative necessity to outright punishment.74 
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights alludes to this argument by noting the incongruity of 
imposing “the severe penalty of the deprivation of liberty which 
is legally reserved for those who have been convicted,” upon 
those who are presumed innocent.75 Accordingly, that court has 
advanced its discussion of the relevance of the presumption of 
innocence in cases of pretrial detention by holding that it is only 
permissible when strictly necessary.76 To allow otherwise would be 
the equivalent of conferring upon an accused a sentence in 
advance of conviction.77 
The strict necessity requirement is endorsed here and, as a 
consequence, it is submitted that courts must carefully assess 
punitive and nonpunitive distinctions when they are made.78 
Failure to do so arguably invites governments to engage in a 
game of semantics, wherein the rhetoric of administration and 
regulation may well render the presumption of innocence void of 
its meaning in the pretrial context.79 It is therefore insufficient 
that the relevant law can be said to have, or give lip service to, a 
nonpunitive purpose. This nonpunitive purpose must be 
established in the case at hand. 
Moreover, for pretrial detention to comply with the 
presumption of innocence in a given case, the “nonpunitive” 
purpose that supports detention must be one that relates to the 
integrity of the judicial process. Such constraints ensure a fair 
 
74. See FLEMMING, supra note 38, at 2 (“Punishment before trial . . . shares the same 
features as sentencing following conviction.”). 
75. Giminez v. Argentina, Case 11.245, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/96, 
EA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 14, ¶ 80 (1996), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
cases/1996/argentina12-96.htm. 
76. See Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 35, ¶ 77 
(Nov. 12, 1997). 
77. See id. Although its discussion does not reference the presumption specifically, 
the European Court of Human Rights has likewise noted that invalid pretrial detention 
may (impermissibly) equate to anticipatory punishment. Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), at 21 (1991). 
78. Similarly, as to arbitrary detention, see infra Part III.D. 
79. See, e.g., Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 175–76 (1987). 
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and effective system of justice by requiring the presence of the 
accused at trial80 and by providing a safeguard against witness 
and evidence tampering so that “the judicial process be free from 
prejudicial influences.”81 By contrast, pretrial detention that is 
designed to prevent an accused from committing a crime while 
released (other than one affiliated with interfering with the 
course of justice in the matter at hand) is a patent violation of 
the presumption.82 In sum, a broad and positive notion of the 
presumption of innocence is necessary.83 
II. NUREMBERG AND TOKYO—AN ABSENCE OF PRECEDENT 
Despite the noted importance of liberty interests and the 
presumption of innocence, the right to release did not exist at 
the international tribunals that preceded the ICTY. As such, the 
practice and procedure employed at Nuremberg84 and Tokyo85 
provide no workable precedent with regard to issues of liberty 
and detention.86 Instead, the exercise of each of these post World 
War II tribunals does little more than highlight the fact that 
there then existed a real lacuna regarding defendants’ rights in 
this area of law. In contrast to normally acceptable procedure 
 
80. See Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of 
John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 404 (1970). Due process issues may be raised with 
regard to trials in absentia. See Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. 
Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, ¶ 56 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of 
Judges Higgins, Koojimans & Buergenthal) (“If it is said that a person must be within 
the jurisdiction at the time of the trial itself, that may be a prudent guarantee for the 
right of fair trial . . . .”). 
81. Thomas C. French, Is it Punitive or is it Regulatory? United States v. Salerno, 20 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 189, 221 (1988). 
82. French, like others before him, likens this situation to the experiences of Alice 
in Wonderland. French, supra note 81, at 219 (“[T]here’s the King’s Messenger. He’s in 
prison now, being punished: and the trial doesn’t even begin till next Wednesday: and 
of course the crime comes last of all. ‘Suppose he never commits the crime?’ said Alice. 
‘That would be all the better, wouldn’t it?’ the Queen said.” (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 88 (1902))). 
83. See Kitai, supra note 43, at 281–82 (describing a positive notion of the 
presumption as one that involves a partnership between the citizen and the state). 
84. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
85. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, Special 
Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, April 26, 
1946, 4 U.S.T. 27, 4 Bevans 20. 
86. See, e.g., ZAPPALA, supra note 66, at 21 (noting the absence of both the right to 
provisional release and the right to remain silent at the tribunals following World War 
II). 
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with regard to detention, and owing to the then-existing 
circumstances, many defendants were taken into custody prior to 
the creation of the two military tribunals, let alone the issuance 
of indictments.87 The incorporation of provisions that ensured 
respect for the liberty rights of those accused was most likely 
unthinkable at the time; with but one exception, pretrial 
detention was the rule for all accused.88  
Yet great strides in international human rights law came 
about in the period following the Second World War. Liberty 
standards advanced almost immediately with the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,89 and the rights 
of accused persons, in particular the right to liberty and the right 
to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention, were both 
recognized and refined over the fifty years that followed.90 As a 
consequence, by the late twentieth century, at the time of the 
creation of the ICTY, international and regional human rights 
law regimes dictated the right to remain at liberty as the rule and 
pretrial detention the exception.91 
 
87. See id. at 67. 
88. See Salvatore Zappala, Rights of Persons during an Investigation, in 2 THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1181, 1186 
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (observing, “it seems there was no chance to argue 
for provisional release”). Zappala notes that only one Nuremberg defendant, Gustav 
Krupp Van Bholen, escaped pretrial detention. Id. n.10. Owing to Van Bohlen’s mental 
condition, the Tribunal granted his counsel’s request to indefinitely postpone the 
proceedings against him. 2 NUREMBERG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 20 (Nov. 15, 1945). 
89. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person.”). 
90. See, e.g., Zappala, supra note 66, at 1186–90 (explaining that the terse provisions 
found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “were the cornerstone for the 
subsequent codification of more detailed norms”). 
91. See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 25, art. 7(5) (establishing that anyone detained 
“shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released 
without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings”); ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 
9(3) (“It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in 
custody . . . .”); ECHR, supra note 24, art. 5(3) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrest 
or detention and providing that persons so held are entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or release pending trial). See generally, Christopher Lehmann, Bail Reform in 
Ukraine: Transplanting Western Legal Concepts to Post-Soviet Legal Systems, 13 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 191, 210 (2000) (noting the article’s silence as to the principle of proportionality 
and the absence of any requirement besides reasonable suspicion, such as risk of flight, 
but observing that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has 
shored up some of these weaknesses). Lehmann states, “[i]f anything, the standards 
provided by Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights fall short of the 
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III. PRETRIAL RELEASE AT THE ICTY 
Had the norm that pretrial detention is an exceptional 
measure been expressly incorporated into the statute of the 
tribunal, the ICTY’s pretrial release regime would obviously have 
had to conform to its parameters. However, the ICTY Statute, 
which dictates that indicted persons are to be taken into custody 
pursuant to a warrant or order,92 makes no reference to pretrial 
release. Thus, the tribunal’s judges, charged with the task of 
“adopt[ing] rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of 
the pretrial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the 
admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses 
and other appropriate matters,”93 were left to address the issue of 
release as they saw fit. Remarkably, for some of the judges, this 
meant that the issue of release need not be addressed at all. 
A. Mechanism for Pretrial Release: Obligatory or Optional? 
Initially, some members of the tribunal ascribed to the point 
of view that pretrial release was an unnecessary facet for the 
administration of justice on the basis of the expectation that trials 
would proceed quickly;94 others believed that the possibility for 
release ought not to exist, given that the crimes within the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction95 “were akin to murder or other crimes for 
which most [domestic] judicial systems would not allow bail 
anyway.”96 Experience, of course, has proved the former view 
groundless.97 It remains a worthwhile endeavor, however, to 
address the latter issue before moving forward. 
 
common Western norm, and of the specific performance provided in many Western 
nations.” Id. 
92. ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 20. 
93. Id. at art. 15. 
94. Indicative of the fact that, contrary to the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, the right to release was viewed by some judges as an alternative to 
“trial within a reasonable time.” See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
95. See ICTY Statute, supra note 3, arts. 2–5 (conferring jurisdiction to adjudicate 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of certain laws or customs of war, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity). 
96. Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 232. 
97. See, e.g., Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy—Efforts to 
Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 82, 84 
(2005) (observing that ICTY proceedings have been slow and have given rise to 
“concerns about efficiency and the length of pretrial detention”); Alex Whiting, In 
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1. Severity of the Crimes 
It is beyond dispute that those charged with egregious 
crimes in domestic systems generally do not enjoy pretrial 
release. Yet it is incorrect to assume that, as a consequence, it 
might be appropriate for a U.N. tribunal to assert that the types 
of crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction automatically preclude 
any form of pretrial release. Such an approach would contradict 
the standards developed by the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
in the municipal realm98 and, accordingly, would not be 
representative of “enlightened justice.”99 Of equal import, the 
denial of the right to release based solely upon the nature of the 
crime charged would fail to contribute to a human rights regime 
and thus would be an erroneous act on the part of the tribunal. 
The case law of the European Court makes clear that 
legislation that removes judicial discretion in release 
considerations fails to meet established standards of fair trial. 
Such was the situation with regard to section 25 of the United 
Kingdom’s Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,100 which 
precluded the possibility of pretrial release for those charged 
with one in a list of enumerated crimes if previously convicted of 
one of those crimes. In first addressing the matter, the European 
Court of Human Rights merely accepted the government’s 
concession that the municipal provision was incompatible with 
article 5(3) of the convention.101 As explained by the opinion of 
the now defunct European Commission, attached in full to the 
court’s decision, the relevant subarticle requires that the judicial 
figure before which an accused appears must have the authority 
 
International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 323, 323–34 (2009). 
98. See, e.g., U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights 
Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Mauritius, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/83/MUS (Apr. 27, 2005) (noting “with concern that bail is not allowed 
under the Dangerous Drugs Act 2000 for persons arrested or held in custody for sale of 
drugs”). 
99. William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights 
Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 461, 516 (1997). 
100. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 25 (U.K.). 
101. Caballero v. United Kingdom, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 45, 54; see also ECHR, 
supra note 24, at art. 5(3) (“‘Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial.”). 
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to order his release.102 The guarantee afforded by the provision is 
that there will be judicial consideration of the facts of his case 
“which militate for and against the continuation of pre-trial 
detention.”103 
In the later decision of S.B.C. v. the United Kingdom, section 
25 was again the subject of complaint, and the U.K. government 
for a second time conceded its nonconformity with article 
5(3).104 In this matter, the court provided a more substantive 
analysis, adopting full-scale the views of the European 
Commission: 
[J]udicial control of interference by the executive with an 
individual’s right to liberty [is] an essential feature of the 
guarantees embodied in Article 5(3), the purpose being to 
minimise the risk of arbitrariness in the pre-trial detention of 
accused persons. Certain procedural and substantive 
guarantees ensure that judicial control: the judge (or other 
officer) before whom the accused is “brought promptly” 
must be seen to be independent of the executive and of the 
parties to the proceedings; that judge, having heard the 
accused himself, must examine all the facts arguing for and 
against the existence of a genuine requirement of public 
interest justifying, with due regard to the presumption of 
innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for the 
accused’s liberty, and that judge must have the power to 
order an accused’s release . . . . [A] removal of the judicial 
control of pre-trial detention required by Article 5(3) of the 
Convention was found by the Commission to amount to a 
violation of that Article . . . . The Court sees no reason to 
disagree with the conclusions reached by the 
Commission . . . .105 
Thus, the absolute ban on the grant of release for a 
particular class of accused violates article 5(3) of the ECHR106 
and, arguably, the corresponding provision in the ICCPR that 
 
102. Caballero, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 68 (attaching the merits section of the 
Commission’s opinion in full). 
103. Id. 
104. S.B.C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39360/98, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 619, 623 
(2002). 
105. Id. at 624–25. 
106. See Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 2001 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 98 (Eur. Court of 
H.R.).(“Any system of mandatory detention on remand is per se incompatible with 
Article 5(3) of the Convention . . . .”), as reprinted in 12 HUM. RTS. CASE DIGEST 597 
(2001). 
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equally necessitates judicial supervision of deprivations of 
liberty.107 In addition, detention absent a showing of reasonable 
necessity gives rise to the possibility of arbitrary detention,108 in 
violation of article 9(1) of the ICCPR.109 The relevance of these 
instruments, which form part of public international law, is 
particularly cogent at the ICTY, where at least one trial chamber 
has averred that “no distinction can be drawn between persons 
facing criminal procedures in their home country or on an 
international level.”110 
2. Relevance of International and Regional Jurisprudence to 
the Tribunal 
Of course, the inaugural members of the ICTY were no 
more required to incorporate the mandates of international and 
regional human rights bodies in their proposed rules of 
procedure and evidence111 than they would when applying the 
provisions of the tribunal’s statute and rules.112 Nevertheless, 
 
107. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 9(3) (“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release . . . .”). 
108. See HRC, Communication No. 1128/2002: Views of the Human Rights Committee 
Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Marques de Morais v. Angola), ¶ 6.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (Mar. 29, 
2005) (“[T]he notion of ‘arbitrariness’ is not to be equated with ‘against the law’, but 
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, 
lack of predictability and due process of law. This means that remand in custody must 
not only be lawful but reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances, for example to 
prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime.” (emphasis 
added)). This issue is discussed in greater detail infra Part III.D. 
109. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 9(1) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest 
or detention . . . .”). 
110. Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-53-PT, Decision on Request for 
Provisional Release of Accused Jokić, ¶ 15, (Mar. 28, 2002). Conversely, the importance 
of the ICCPR and relevant regional instruments has been sidelined by others, owing to 
the fact that the ICTY exclusively deals with serious crimes. See, e.g., Fergal Gaynor, 
Provisional Release at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in THE 
LEGAL REGIME OF THE ICC: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROF. I.P. BLISHCHENKO (Jose Doria 
et.al. eds., 2009). 
111. Excepting, of course, those elements incorporated in the ICTY’s statute, such 
as the aspects of ICCPR article 14 that appear in articles 21 and 20 of the ICTY and ICTR 
statutes, respectively. 
112. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion 
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶ 27 (Aug. 10, 1995) 
(concluding that the interpretations of other judicial bodies are of “limited relevance” 
given their separate legal frameworks and the unique context of the tribunal). This 
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numerous members, according to Judge Wald, saw the 
importance of ensuring that the rules conformed to the 
provisions of the ECHR.113 
Although the rationale for this desire was never provided, it 
can be speculatively attributed to a number of different factors. 
First, a unique aspect of the ICTY is that it draws upon 
international human rights law.114 In light of this seminal trait, 
and the fact that the ICTY renders justice in Europe on matters 
involving European citizens, it is certainly a reasonable aim to 
have the practice of the ICTY reflect the human rights standards 
of the region.115 Moreover, if the practice of the ICTY were seen 
to be noncompliant with established human rights standards, it 
would not only call into question the validity of the tribunal’s 
proceedings but could also “set [the progress made in] human 
rights back decades.”116 Finally, it was also incumbent upon the 
ICTY judiciary, when drafting the rules that would govern its 
function, to act in accordance with the proclamation of the U.N. 
Secretary-General that “the International Tribunal must fully 
respect internationally recognized standards at all stages of its 
proceedings.”117 Indeed, the jurisprudence of the ICTY has 
expressly recognized that “[a]s a Tribunal of the United Nations, 
the ICTY is committed to the standards of the ICCPR” and that 
“the inhabitants of member states of the United Nations enjoy 
the fundamental freedoms [delineated therein] within the 
framework of a United Nations court.”118 
 
position, of course, has altered over time such that the joint Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY and ICTR later noted that the international and regional human rights documents 
and their related jurisprudence hold “persuasive authority” in the decision-making of 
the tribunals. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-I-AR72, Decision, ¶ 40 (Nov. 
3, 1999). 
113. See Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 232–33. 
114. See Schabas, supra note 99, at 514. 
115. The relevance of this is highlighted in the jurisprudence of the tribunal. See, 
e.g., Blagojević, Decision on Request for Provisional Release of Accused Jokić, ¶¶ 14–15 
(noting that the ICTY is entrusted to bring justice to a part of Europe, that parts of the 
former Yugoslavia are now party to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
that all inhabitants of the states of the former Yugoslavia are entitled to equal treatment 
regardless of membership in the Council of Europe). 
116. Schabas, supra note 99, at 516. 
117. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 106, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (emphasis added). 
118. Blagojević, Decision on Request for Provisional Release of Accused Jokić, ¶ 13. 
Similarly, the idea of turning to the jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
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Despite this, the argument remains that the distinctive setup 
of the ICTY should dictate a practice different from that which is 
mandated on the domestic level by human rights regimes. In this 
regard, it is submitted that such a discussion should not revolve 
around the “institutional shortcomings” of the ICTY,119 but 
rather whether its framework is one that obviates the need for 
that which is dictated in the municipal sphere. This is a relevant 
consideration, particularly when the interpretation at issue relies 
upon the separation of powers, as the construct of the tribunal 
does not conform to this standard. Yet, despite the fact that the 
judges of the ICTY straddle the legislative and judicial branches, 
the prosecution clearly embodies a separate executive branch in 
the tribunal’s “primarily adversarial system.”120 As follows, it is 
submitted that this is a pivotal factor in determining the 
relevance of the rationale provided by the European Court in 
S.B.C. v. United Kingdom as it relates to the practice of the 
Tribunal. 
In S.B.C. v. United Kingdom, the court deemed it imperative 
that systems of justice include the safeguard of judicial review 
when an act of the executive branch impinges upon the liberty 
interests of an individual.121 Judicial review, it noted, reduces the 
risk of arbitrary detention.122 This is effectively accomplished by 
the examination of all of the evidence, including that put forth 
by the accused, while maintaining independence from both the 
executive branch and the parties. 
One can readily see a place for this line of argument when 
assessing the activity of a common law system, such as that of the 
United Kingdom. In such systems, investigations are initiated and 
conducted by the prosecutor (an interested party in the 
proceedings), charges are contained in an indictment, and 
suspects are generally not permitted to contest evidence prior to 
 
for guidance has trickled over to the ICTR as a result of the tribunals’ shared Appeals 
Chamber. See, e.g., Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment of the 
Appeals Chamber, ¶ 1 (May 20, 2005) (Pocar, J., dissenting) (concluding that article 24 
of the ICTR Statute must be read in conformity with article 14(5) of the ICCPR). 
119. Examples of this include the fact that the ICTY does not have its own police 
force and that it is located at a distance from the conflict. These matters are considered 
further in a different context, infra Parts III.E, IV. 
120. Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Dec. 17, 2004). 
121. S.B.C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39360/98, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 619, 624 
(2002). 
122. See id. 
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trial.123 This approach lies in stark contrast to comparable 
continental procedures, which utilize an impartial magistrate (or 
some other sort of neutral oversight) in the investigatory stage 
and allow the opportunity for the target of an investigation to be 
heard prior to the finalization of the charges against him or 
her.124 Simply put, the common law approach is void of the 
continental orientation in which “state organs bear responsibility 
during the [pretrial] process for the well-being of the 
defendant.”125 Accordingly, it is submitted that the need for 
judicial review, as noted by the European Court in S.B.C., is at 
least more obviously necessary126 in a common law system than in 
a continental system.127 
This observation is of particular relevance when considering 
the applicability of the rationale employed by the European 
Court to the workings of the ICTY. In the latter forum, the 
sequence of events that leads up to an arrest warrant for an 
accused is in essence a prosecution-based venture of investigation 
and indictment as set out in the ICTY Statute.128 The authorizing 
document of the ICTY precludes any type of official oversight of 
pretrial investigation by the prosecution by making investigation 
the sole responsibility of the prosecutor.129 The system 
established for the preparation and confirmation of indictments 
 
123. See, e.g., Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY 
and its Progeny: Due Process Deficit, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 243, 250–51 (2004). 
124. See id. at 248–50. 
125. J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 75 
(2001). 
126. Of course, continental efforts to secure neutrality and protect the rights of the 
accused throughout the pretrial process are not always successful. See, e.g., ANTONIO 
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 368 (2003). 
127. This may lead to the conclusion that this line of European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence represents “an unwelcome common-law incursion” on continental 
procedure. Mitchel De S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, The European Pasteurization of French Law, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1071 (2005). As has been observed, case law of the European 
Court “has been approved on many occasions, without the impartiality and 
independence of the various judicial figures concerned (an impartiality and 
independence which permeates their acts) having made the least impression on that 
line of argument.” Plant v. Commission, Case C-480/99P, 2002 E.C.R. I-265, ¶ 36. 
128. ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 18. 
129. Id. art. 16(2) (“The prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of 
the Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or 
from any other source.” (emphasis added)); see also Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 
507, 517 (1994) (“Any other source must . . . include the Tribunal and the Security 
Council.” (emphasis added)). 
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therefore, resembles the common law approach, with a 
prosecution-prepared indictment130 and subsequent judicial 
review.131 
Moreover, the ICTY Statute dictates an adversarial construct 
for the tribunal by “discard[ing] the model based upon an 
investigating judge responsible for gathering evidence on behalf 
of both parties” and incorporating “the fundamental features of 
the adversarial system.”132 As a result, the procedural rules 
created by the judges followed suit, imposing no affirmative duty 
upon the prosecutor to seek out exculpatory evidence, although 
requiring disclosure of such evidence if known.133 Thus, as in 
adversarial systems where defense attorneys assume the main 
burden to investigate exculpatory evidence,134 “[t]he primary 
responsibility for investigating the charges against an accused, 
including seeking and gathering information related to those 
charges, lies with defence counsel.”135 
This understanding of the pretrial activity of the ICTY and 
the roles assumed by the parties underscores the fact that judicial 
oversight of pretrial detention is as essential a criterion in the 
practice of the tribunal as it is in the domestic (adversarial) 
sphere. While the requirement of judicial review prior to 
indictment is a vital component in this process, it cannot be seen 
to satisfy completely the supervision required to ensure that the 
detention of an accused is just. At the time of review, the judge 
has heard only from the prosecution, an interested party in the 
proceedings under no obligation to seek out exculpatory 
evidence and free from any sort of oversight in his investigations. 
It is thus fitting and appropriate to have in place a mechanism 
that ensures judicial control over the subsequent interference 
with the liberty interests of an accused. To act otherwise would 
render illusory the appearance of the independence of the 
 
130. ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 18(4). 
131. Id. art. 19(1). 
132. CASSESE, supra note 126, at 384. 
133. See Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo. [ICTY], Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, R. 68, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Feb. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Original ICTY Rules]. 
134. See Renee Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial 
for an American Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 818 (2001). A 
failure on behalf of defense counsel to perform this task would likely result in an 
appellate finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 
135. Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Joint Decision on Motions 
Related to Production of Evidence, ¶ 26 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
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judiciary and, by only allowing for prosecutorial input on the 
matter, would subvert the goal of equal treatment of the parties. 
Moreover, it would send the message that the judiciary stands 
ready to endorse prosecutorial submissions and is unwilling to 
review its own decisions. By contrast, the tribunal can be seen as 
conforming with the statutory requirement that it “satisf[ies] 
itself that the rights of the accused are respected” by properly 
assessing the pretrial detention of the accused.136 In addition, this 
approach preserves the double meaning of due process—to 
ensure the protection of the right to liberty, and also to serve as a 
“structural protection that is meant to prevent the excessive 
blurring of the lines between the executive and judicial 
powers.”137 
Thus, the decision to include a right to provisional release 
within the framework of the ICTY was an appropriate rather than 
generous measure. Regardless of the judicial motivation for its 
inclusion, the opportunity for release was called for from a 
human rights perspective generally138 and with regard to the 
tribunal’s composition specifically. This is an important factor as 
regards the discussion that follows. If it were not incumbent 
upon the judges of the tribunal to provide a mechanism for 
pretrial release in the first place, one could hardly be critical of 
any method subsequently established which makes such release 
possible. However, as this type of mechanism was a necessary 
component of the tribunal’s practice, it makes sense to address 
the rule as originally adopted, and as subsequently modified, to 
assess whether ICTY precedent in this area is worthy of imitation. 
 
136. ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(3). 
137. Jared Perkins, Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
and Citizen Enemy Combatants, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 437, 457 (2005) (internal citation 
omitted); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1687 (2004) (“The guarantees of our rights simultaneously provide guideposts for the 
exercise of executive authority.”). 
138. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the 
Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 35 (Aug. 14, 2009) (concluding that 
internationally-recognized human rights dictate that an accused person “have access to a 
judicial authority vested with the power to adjudicate upon the lawfulness and 
justification of his or her detention”). 
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B. Drafting History of the ICTY Rules 
As Judge Wald notes, those judges who sought to create a set 
of rules that were in compliance with the ECHR were not alone 
in subscribing to the opinion that the opportunity for release 
ought to be incorporated into the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (“ICTY RPE”); nongovernmental international 
organizations, such as Amnesty International, joined in this 
perspective as well.139 
In this respect, Security Council Resolution 827 facilitated 
the transfer of suggestions for the yet undrafted rules, providing 
that the same be forwarded to the tribunal’s judges by the 
Secretary-General.140 The tribunal’s judiciary later recognized 
that the proposals it received were of valuable assistance141 and, 
among them, was a memorandum tendered by the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights. In accordance with the 
aforementioned ECHR case law, the memorandum provided in 
pertinent part that “[t]he Tribunal, or any judge of the Tribunal 
should have the power to permit release of any [detained] 
person upon the sufficient posting of bail.”142 This suggestion is 
consistent with the Australian submission which “considers that 
the rules of procedure and evidence for the International 
Tribunal should draw on internationally recognised norms and 
standards.”143 
Yet no other submission specifically addresses the issue, with 
the exception of the expansive proposal tendered by the United 
States, which called for a provision that is noticeably at odds with 
established international norms. The proposed rule seemingly 
makes detention the rule and appears to impose tacitly a defense-
based burden of proof in relation to release: 
Once confined, an accused may not be released except upon 
order of the Trial Chamber . . . . Release may be ordered by 
 
139. Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 232–33. 
140. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
141. First Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 9, ¶ 55. 
142. Memorandum of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia Since 1991, II(C), UN Doc. 
IT/INF 4 (Nov. 19, 1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 84, at 565, 566. 
143. Australian Comments on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International 
Tribunal, U.N. Doc. IT/5 (Nov. 16, 1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 84, 
at 507, 507. 
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the Trial Chamber only in extraordinary circumstances, or if 
it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if 
released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or 
other person.144 
Indeed, much can be seen of this proposal in the rule 
ultimately adopted by the judges at the first plenary. However, 
the tribunal’s initial offering actually pared down the United 
States submission and, in so doing, established a system of 
provisional release that was even more inconsistent with 
international norms. Rule sixty-five as originally adopted 
provided in relevant part that “[r]elease may be ordered by a 
Trial Chamber only in exceptional circumstances, after hearing 
the host country and only if it is satisfied that the accused will 
appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to any 
victim, witness or other person.”145 
1. Rationales for the Initially Adopted Rule on Provisional 
Release 
a. Formally Recognized Reasons 
In scaling back the U.S. proposal, the ICTY’s judges strayed 
from the purported goal of some ECHR conformity and, in so 
doing, acted in a manner that belied any interest in complying 
with international standards.146 In fact, it seems the tribunal’s 
judges were persuaded only by the practical necessity that certain 
accused might be so ill or infirmed as to “exceptionally” require 
release.147 As interpreted, the initial rule turned international 
human rights law on its head, with trial chambers averring that 
the provision dictated detention on remand as “the norm” and 
provisional release “the exception.”148 Judges justified this mode 
of operations by noting both the gravity of the offences charged 
 
144. Suggestions Made by the Government of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. 
IT/14 (Nov. 17, 1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 84, at 509, 532. 
145. Original ICTY Rules, supra note 133, R. 65(B). 
146. Cf. Lehmann, supra note 91, at 193 (“Internationally accepted standards of 
human rights require that persons accused of a crime should be released from detention 
pending their trial . . . whenever possible.”). 
147. Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 233. 
148. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Motion of the 
Defence Filed Pursuant to Rule 64 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 13 (Apr. 3, 
1994). 
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and the tribunal’s institutional shortcomings.149 This seeming 
disregard for the right to release has been dubbed “one of the 
great travesties characterizing international criminal cases to 
date”150 and the tribunal’s adopted approach has repeatedly been 
recognized as one that affronts established international human 
rights standards. 
b. Other Factors 
Of course, other factors other than those noted above may 
well have played a role in the decision to presume detention over 
liberty, despite the tribunal’s failure to formally recognize them. 
For example, Judge Wald cites “the perceived inconsistency in 
asking UN and national peacekeeping forces to risk their lives to 
apprehend indicted war criminals only to have them promptly 
released at arraignment.”151 Yet, there are serious problems with 
including this factor as a reason for reversing the presumption in 
favor of release, an action that affects all cases coming before the 
tribunal. As is highlighted time and again in relevant human 
rights jurisprudence and, indeed, that of the tribunal, release 
determinations are individual and must be made on a case-by-
case basis. If an accused proves elusive at the outset and imperils 
those who apprehend him, this will be a relevant (and, 
presumably, a decisive) factor in the determination made 
regarding his pretrial detention status. Yet there is neither a 
logical nor just basis for painting other accused with the same 
brush. Rather, imposing such a penalty across the board feeds 
into the philosophy that the tribunal’s priority is not justice in 
each individual case, but instead the assessment of its activities by 
outside entities. 
 
149. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Motion for 
Provisional Release filed by the Accused, Zejnil Delalić, ¶ 20 (Sept. 25, 1996) (indicating 
that the tribunal “is not in possession of any form of mechanism, such as a police force, 
that could exercise control over the accused, nor does it have any control over the area 
in which the accused would reside if released.”). There are also no penalties in place for 
failure to appear. See Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 236. 
150. David Aronofsky, International War Crimes and other Criminal Courts: Ten 
Recommendations for Where We Go From Here and How to Get There—Looking to a Permanent 
International Criminal Tribunal, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 17, 26 (2006). 
151. Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 235 (internal citation omitted). 
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i. Public Reaction 
The general perception of “the international community” 
may have played a role in the ICTY’s disfavor toward release.152 
Yet, from a human rights perspective, the ability of the 
community at large to play a role in release determinations is 
necessarily constricted. While it is true that the gravity of a charge 
and public reaction to the same “may give rise to a social 
disturbance capable of justifying pre-trial detention,”153 this 
approach can only be rightfully employed in a very limited set of 
situations. Similar to the language initially employed in the 
tribunals’ respective rules, the European Court notes that such 
an argument may sustain an act of pretrial detention only in 
“exceptional circumstances.”154 The court further provides that 
such measures may be employed only when “based on facts 
capable of showing that the release of a specific accused would 
actually disturb public order” and that the threat to the public 
order must remain in order for ongoing detention to be 
legitimate.155 
Thus, an amorphous and universal attempt to satisfy popular 
opinion could never justify interference with an individual’s 
liberty interests through the use of pretrial detention. Rather, in 
order to sustain such detention, there must be an articulable 
threat. While even this approach remains somewhat problematic, 
in that it gives rise to the possibility that public opinion may 
dictate whether an individual has access to personal liberty 
interests, from a practical standpoint this is a seemingly necessary 
measure. Similar to other permissible derogations from state 
obligations when faced with a threat to the life of a nation, one 
can see the need for a provision that allows for detention in 
order to avoid social disturbance. Moreover, it is a method that 
could equally serve to secure the life and safety of the accused.156 
 
152. See Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 129, at 532 (noting that “the desire to avoid a 
public outcry over allowing accused persons to be at large” may possibly explain the 
stringency of the tribunal’s original release provision). 
153. Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1991). 
154. Kemmache v. France, 208 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1991). 
155. Id. 
156. Of course, such cases need to be carefully evaluated, as instances in which it is 
asserted that detention is for the “protection” of the accused are often the most 
objectionable. See GERHARD O.W. MUELLER & FRE LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 101 (1969). 
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For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is of seminal 
importance that if public reaction in some way affected either the 
drafting of the original Rule 65 or its subsequent interpretation, 
it did not do so in a way that conforms to internationally 
accepted standards. Rather than allowing for case-by-case 
determinations, which would permit detention in a narrow set of 
circumstances, detention was presumed for all accused. 
ii. Judicial Insecurity 
Of course, the view of the international community and the 
perception of alleged victims are not the only opinions that have 
possible relevance when it comes to the ultimate position 
assumed by the judiciary. The assumed political independence of 
this body from both the U.N. General Assembly and Security 
Council is likely not a complete reality.157 Financial dependence 
and the wish to be re-elected may entice members of the 
judiciary to act in a manner that they anticipate will be positively 
perceived by the U.N. organs.158 The potential effect accordingly 
plays out on two fields: at plenary meetings where rules are 
created and amended; and on the bench, where such rules are 
interpreted and applied. 
In short, judges making bail determinations may feel 
personally compelled or tempted to decide against pretrial 
release. Members of the judiciary acting in this capacity do so 
knowing that that the determinations they make may 
subsequently be subject to criticism. Releasing an accused creates 
the possibility that he or she may commit an offence throughout 
the pretrial period or may in some way interfere with justice. The 
decision to detain, on the other hand, is foolproof: “when the 
system detains persons who could have safely been released, its 
errors will be invisible.”159 Therefore, elected and appointed 
judicial officials who find that they are navigating veritable 
 
157. The range of substantive law has been shaped by political considerations. See, 
e.g., ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 330 (2005) (“The ambit of 
international criminal law has never been apolitical.”). Accordingly, it follows that the 
process of trying such crimes is likely similarly affected. 
158. Tribunal judges are eligible for re-election by the U.N. General Assembly. 
ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(4). This is a factor that “could mitigate against the 
principle of judicial independence.” M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 806 (1996). 
159. Tribe, supra note 80, at 375. 
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landmines in determining the pretrial fate of certain accused 
individuals may succumb to external pressures. In fact, an 
individual in a nonpermanent position or subject to sanctions 
may well err on the side of caution and find in favor of pretrial 
incarceration.160 Accordingly, one might assert that by making 
detention the exception, the tribunal’s judiciary insulated itself 
from the negative ramifications of making “wrong” decisions. 
2. Subsequent Amendments 
Like many provisions in the ICTY RPE, Rule 65 has been 
amended a number of times. In 1997; the rule was amended for 
the first time to create an opportunity for interlocutory appeal, 
albeit with the proviso that leave to appeal would only be granted 
once “serious cause” was established to the satisfaction of a 
bench of three judges of the appeals chamber.161 Although the 
tribunal proffered no explanation for the amendment,162 the 
provision made some perceptible headway from a fair trial 
perspective,163 as did the language implemented in the months 
 
160. Flemming marks many bail decisions down to “context,” noting that hostile 
environments and job insecurity of those who set bail results in higher levels of pretrial 
incarceration—a theory borne out by his study of two dissimilarly situated judicial 
systems in the United States. FLEMMING, supra note 38, at 136–38. 
161. ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 65(D), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.11 (July 
25, 1997). The term “serious cause” was subsequently interpreted by the appeals 
chamber as showing  
a grave error in the decision which would cause substantial prejudice to the 
accused or is detrimental to the interests of justice or raise[s] issues which are 
not only of general importance but are also directly relevant to the future 
development of trial proceedings, in that the decision by the Appeals 
Chamber would seriously impact upon further proceedings before the Trial 
Chamber . . . . 
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal 
(Provisional Release) by Hazim Delić, ¶ 12(3) (Nov. 22, 1996). 
162. The relevant annual report acknowledged that the amendment was 
substantive, but provided no further information. The President of the ICTY, Fourth 
Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 56, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/52/375, S/1997/729 (Sept. 18, 1997). 
163. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: The Use of Unnamed Witnesses 
Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 235, 235 (1996) (remarking on the “daunting 
prospect” of a post-judgment appeal); see also Jill Paradise Botler et. al, The Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of New York: An Empirical Study of Its Powers and Functions as 
an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 929, 931 (1979) (concluding that a 
broad scope of interlocutory review “ensure[s] that substantial justice is available to the 
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that followed, as the threshold for appeal was lessened from 
“serious” to “good cause.”164 However, these efforts to improve 
upon the rule did little to change the outcome of its application. 
Those seeking leave to appeal from provisional release 
determinations, like those seeking provisional release,165 were 
routinely rejected,166 and “the depressive effects of lengthy 
pretrial detention without regular contact with the court” 
developed into a problem at the tribunal.167 
The most remarkable amendment to the rule governing 
provisional release came in late 1999, when the ICTY repealed its 
“exceptional circumstances” requirement.168 This amendment 
 
litigants” (citation omitted)). The negative ramifications of an unfair denial of 
provisional release are, moreover, immediately tangible and incapable of adequate 
remedy post-trial. 
164. ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 65(D), UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.12 (Nov. 
12, 1997). Similarly, the tribunal only acknowledged the amendment in passing. The 
President of the ICTY, Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 105, delivered to the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/53/219, S/1998/737 (Aug. 10, 1998) (concurrently 
shortening the window of appeal from fifteen to seven days) [hereinafter Fifth Annual 
Report of the ICTY]. According to ICTR appellate jurisprudence, “good cause” requires 
that “a party seeking leave to appeal under [the] provision satisfies the bench of the 
Appeals Chamber that the Trial Chamber may have erred in making its decision.” 
Ndayambaje v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-8-A, Decision on Motion to Appeal Against 
the Provisional Release Decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 October 2002, at 4 (Jan. 10, 
2003). 
165. See Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 233 (“[C]ase after case, the various trial 
chambers adhered unrelentingly to the presumption against release and in favour of 
detention.”). 
166. See, e.g., The President of the ITCY, Seventh Annual Report of the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 100, delivered to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/273, S/2000/777 (Aug. 7, 
2000) [hereinafter Seventh Annual Report of the ICTY] (reporting that all six applications 
for leave to appeal from a decision on provisional release that were received during the 
year were denied); The President of the ITCY, Sixth Annual Report of the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 64, 
delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/187, S/1999/846 
(Aug. 25, 1999) (reporting that eight of fifteen such applications were denied); Fifth 
Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 164, ¶ 100–02 (reporting that seven of eight such 
applications were denied). 
167. Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 233. The deaths of two detained 
individuals caused the tribunal to implement status conferences every 120 days which 
the accused could attend and answer questions about the conditions of detention. Id. 
168. See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R.65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.17 
(Dec. 7, 1999). Four years passed before the ICTR followed suit. Int’l Criminal Tribunal 
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was made just before the release of a report rendered by an 
expert group assigned to evaluate the work of the tribunal and its 
sister court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”).169 The group found the prior standard proved 
“difficult” to satisfy in practice,170 an unsurprising fact given that 
prolonged pretrial incarceration was routinely rejected as 
independently establishing an exceptional circumstance at both 
tribunals. Indeed, this was so even in an egregious case at the 
ICTR where the detention at issue exceeded six years in 
duration.171 The expert group’s report accordingly linked the 
high threshold initially in place at the ICTY with the dismal state 
of affairs at the tribunal, concluding that this has “naturally given 
rise to serious concerns regarding the generally recognized right 
to a speedy trial.”172 
A perennial interpretational problem with the tribunal’s 
rules, however, is an inability to discern the “legislative intent” 
accompanying their creation (and subsequent amendments 
made to them), as the plenary meetings at which such activities 
occur are held in private. Despite this, judges are free to discuss 
plenary activity and often do just that. Regarding the 
“exceptional circumstances” amendment, Judge Robinson asserts 
that its purpose “was to bring the Rule in line with modern 
international human rights law [which dictates] that detention 
shall not be the general rule.”173 However, the tribunal’s 
comment on the amended version of the rule in its next annual 
 
for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 65(B), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.13 (May 27, 
2003). 
169. See Seventh Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 166, ¶ 320 (requesting that 
the Secretary-General evaluate the efficiency of the operation and function of the 
Tribunals). The practice of the two tribunals is nearly identical. See supra note 7 
170. Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective and Functioning of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the Expert 
Group]. 
171. See Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Release, ¶¶ 4, 28, (July 12, 2002) (recognizing, however,, that the length of 
detention is a factor taken into account to determine whether exceptional 
circumstances exist). 
172. Report of the Expert Group, supra note 170, ¶ 51. 
173. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik & Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momčilo Krajišnik’s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 16 (Oct. 8, 2001) 
(Robinson, J., dissenting). Robinson was a member of the tribunal at the time the 
relevant amendment was made. 
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report was more circumspect, noting that the revision 
“reflect[ed] the circumstances in which the tribunal found itself 
(that is, long delays between trial and arrest, together with the 
number of detainees in custody).”174 
Despite this statement, which in many respects reads in a 
manner akin to Stephen’s description of the inception of bail in 
England,175 the alterations made to Rule 65 over the course of 
the tribunal’s history provide enhanced conformity with 
international standards. In this regard, certain subsequent 
decisions take the opposite position to pre-amendment 
jurisprudence, rejecting the assertion that the “Tribunal’s Statute 
and Rules make detention the rule rather than the exception.”176 
Yet, despite these changes, it is continually noted that that the 
tribunal’s approach to provisional release is at variance with that 
which is dictated by international human rights standards.177 
Accordingly, it remains a worthwhile exercise to consider exactly 
why the tribunal’s original and subsequent methods of dealing 
with the issue of provisional release are so problematic. 
C. Allocation of the Burden of Proof 
Since the repeal of the exceptional circumstances 
requirement in 1999, the amended rule has given rise to 
differing interpretations; “the most contentious in this regard is 
certainly the burden of proof in applications for provisional 
release.”178 Rule 65 itself is silent on the allocation of the burden 
of proof.179 For at least one member of the of the Tribunal’s 
judiciary, the revised rule logically calls for a prosecutorial 
burden, “supported by a consideration of the purpose of the 
 
174. Seventh Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 166, ¶ 293. 
175. See STEPHEN, supra note 40, at 233–39. 
176. Prosecutor v. Brđanin & Talić, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Motion by 
Momir Talić for Provisional Release, ¶ 17 (Mar. 28, 2001). 
177. See, e.g., ZAPPALA, supra note 66, at 70 (observing that the elimination of the 
exceptional circumstances requirement “brought the Rules more into line with human 
rights standards” but that, nonetheless, it still remains true that liberty is the exception 
while detention is the rule). 
178. See Gerhard Kemp, Commentary, Provisional Release, in 8 ANNOTATED LEADING 
CASES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2001–2002, at 83, 85 (André Klip & Göran 
Sluiter eds., 2005). 
179. ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 65(D), UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.44 (Dec. 
10, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules]. 
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amendment, which was to bring the rule in line with modern 
international human rights law that detention shall not be the 
general rule.”180 This, however, remains the minority position. 
With very limited exceptions, those cases that affirmatively 
address the issue of burden allocation adhere to the dominant 
view that the accused continues to bear the burden of proof with 
regard to the establishing the requirements of Rule 65(B).181 In 
fact, this approach is incorporated in the tribunal’s recently 
published manual on its practice.182 Accordingly, the first 
element under consideration is that of the burden of proof183 in 
provisional release matters. 
1. Should a Burden Be Assigned? 
The silence of Rule 65 with regard to the allocation of the 
burden of proof is not unique. Indeed, this approach is common 
in the domestic realm and characteristic of legal drafting in 
common law systems, where many legal provisions do not address 
 
180. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik & Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momcilo Krajisnik’s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 16 (Oct. 8, 2001) 
(Robinson, J., dissenting). 
181. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosević, Case No. IT-02-54T, Decision on Assigned 
Counsel Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 10 (Feb. 23, 2006); Prosecutor v. Šainović & 
Ojdanić, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 2 (Oct. 30, 2002) 
(Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion); Prosecutor v. Brđanin & Talić, Case No. IT-99-36, 
Decision on Motion by Momir Talić for Provisional Release, ¶ 18 (Mar. 28, 2001). This 
approach, as will be discussed in greater detail, infra, does not conform to the prevailing 
view from an international perspective. See, e.g., Gabrielle McIntyre, Defining Human 
Rights in the Arena of International Humanitarian Law: Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of 
the ICTY, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE 
ICTY 193, 229 (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2003) (referring to the accused-
based burden as being “in stark contrast to the approach taken by the human rights 
regime”). 
182. ICTY, ICTY Manual on Developed Practices 65 (2009), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/about/reports%20and%20publications/manual_developed_
practices/icty_manual_on_developed_practices.pdf. 
183. The phrase “burden of proof” has two possible interpretations; it can mean 
either the burden of producing evidence or the burden of persuasion. See JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, 9A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW, § 2483 (3d ed. 1940). While both of these distinct concepts may play a 
role in provisional release matters, “burden of proof” in this context refers to the 
burden of persuasion, or a party’s obligation convince the fact finder of a specific fact at 
issue. 
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the issue of burden allocation.184 Given the reference to the 
common law, it is perhaps initially necessary to address the 
question of whether a burden of proof in provisional release 
matters ought to be allocated at all in the sui generis system that is 
the ICTY. As the Yugoslav Tribunal has for some time been 
diluting its original adversarial structure and procedures by 
moving in a direction that is increasingly continental185 and the 
tribunal’s judges enjoy the ability to order that evidence be 
produced by a party or to summon witnesses on their own 
motion,186 one might conclude that burden allocation is 
unnecessary. After all, the ICTY judiciary, as in continental 
systems, has the power to summon information relevant to the 
question of release.187 
One must, however, bear in mind the manner in which 
provisional release motions have consistently arisen before the 
tribunal, as “burden of proof problems in international law are 
influenced by the character of the proceeding, whether 
predominantly adversarial or investigatory.”188 The adversarial 
aspect inherent in the process that accompanies provisional 
release determinations is pervasive; it has only infrequently been 
the case that the prosecution has consented to or failed to 
oppose an accused’s request for release.189 It is, therefore, this 
aspect of the provisional release process that makes burden 
allocation both necessary and vital. 
Accordingly, the tribunal’s jurisprudence has consistently 
assigned a burden of proof in provisional release matters. By and 
large, as noted, the rule governing provisional release has been 
interpreted as one that calls for an accused-based burden of 
 
184. See Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of 
Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 254 (1987) (remarking that U.S. statutes that 
create a cause of action generally do not allocate the burden of proof). 
185. See generally Darryl A. Mundis, From ‘Common Law’ Towards ‘Civil Law’: The 
Evolution of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 367 (2001) 
(discussing the evolution of the jurisprudence of the ICTY). 
186. See ICTY Rules, supra 179, R. 98. 
187. The continental approach, in which there is a judicial obligation to investigate 
and present evidence as needed, may be seen to obviate the necessity of assigning the 
burden of proof. See JULIANE KOKOTT, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 10 (1998). 
188. Id. at 144. 
189. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Decision on Application 
for Provisional Release (Dec. 12, 2002) (providing one example of the prosecution’s 
choice not to oppose a short-term release). 
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proof, both before and after the exceptional circumstances 
amendment. This assignment of the burden of proof, however, is 
an unsuitable one from a human rights perspective, given the 
right to liberty, the presumption of innocence, and the corollary 
that pretrial detention ought to be an extraordinary measure. 
2. Principles Governing Burden Allocation 
Setting these concerns temporarily aside, however, it makes 
sense to consider the possibilities that were available to the ICTY 
as regards burden allocation, as there is no particular rule of 
distribution that will work in every situation. Rather, determining 
the appropriate rule in order to properly assign the burden “is 
merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in 
the different situations.”190 As a result, any one of a number of 
rules may be utilized in order to determine the appropriate 
allocation in a given case. 
Interestingly, the tribunal’s decision to place the burden of 
proof upon the accused with regard to provisional release 
motions is consistent with the principle of actori incumbit probatio, 
“the broad basic rule with respect to the allocation of the burden 
of proof in international procedure,”191 wherein the party 
putting forth the claim is required to establish its requisite 
elements of law and fact.192 In this respect, the allocation is akin 
to that applied in domestic jurisdictions that heed international 
standards as regards interim release. The variance between the 
two lies not in the adopted rule of allocation, but in the relevant 
rule governing release. Whereas it would normally be the 
responsibility of the prosecution to request remand and, 
accordingly, establish those facts necessary to sustain such a 
motion, the approach employed by the tribunals ensures that the 
obligation to raise the issue of detention versus release lies with 
the accused.193 
 
190. WIGMORE, supra note 183, § 2486. 
191. MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON 
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 116 (1996). Kazazi notes the rule is 
recognized in virtually all of the world’s legal systems and that, despite some variance in 
its application, “the essence of the rule remains the same . . . .” Id. at 116–17. 
192. Id. at 54–66 (tracing the history of the rule and noting its applicability in 
Islamic law and common and civil law jurisdictions). 
193. For a discussion on the disparity between the approach of the tribunal and 
that which is dictated by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, see 
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 As actori incumbit probatio is not the only potential rule 
governing burden allocation, however, it ought not to be a 
foregone conclusion that it is the preferable approach. To 
blindly accept the idea based upon the prominence of the rule 
would be to overlook the overarching importance of the fairness 
considerations noted above. The possibility must rather be 
considered alongside numerous other rules, as “[t]here are no 
hard and fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of 
proof in every situation.”194 Indeed, the ICTY could have availed 
itself of any one of a number of potential rules, such as 
apportioning the burden to one asserting an affirmative 
allegation, or to the party to whose case a fact is essential, or to 
one who has a peculiar means of knowledge to disprove an 
assertion.195 
It therefore makes sense to consider whether, in the context 
of provisional release at the ICTY, any option presents a more 
suitable alternative to that of “he who asserts must prove.” In this 
regard, it bears note that an accused is required to prove a 
negative: that, if released, he or she will not pose a danger to any 
victim, witness, or other person. In the legal realm, establishing a 
negative has historically been regarded as a more difficult task 
than proving an affirmative fact. This deduction has, in turn, had 
the potential to affect burden allocation.196 Nevertheless, in 
recent years, academics have rejected the notion that the burden 
of proof ought to be allocated to the party making an affirmative 
allegation and have rightly highlighted the shortcomings of that 
approach.197 Accordingly, this piece will now consider whether 
the fact that an accused is required to prove a negative ought to 
 
GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 150–54 (2005). 
194. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973). 
195. See generally WIGMORE, supra note 183, § 2486 (delineating numerous 
allocation rules). 
196. See Walker v. Carpenter, 57 S.E. 461, 461 (N.C. 1907) (“The first rule laid 
down in the books on evidence is to the effect that the issue must be proved by the party 
who states an affirmative, not by the party who states a negative.”); see also Repatriation 
Comm’n v. Perrot (1984) 1 F.C.R. 507, 514 (Aus.) (noting that it is often difficult to 
establish negative propositions). 
197. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §337 (John William Strong, ed., 5th ed. 
1999) (referring to the doctrine as erroneous and one that places an undue emphasis on 
the manner in which an issue is pleaded). 
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qualify as a factor for consideration when vetting the tribunal’s 
assignment of the burden of proof in provisional release matters. 
At the outset, it makes sense to pay heed to a thought-
provoking article by Professor Kevin Saunders which sets out to 
dispel “the myth” that it is inherently more difficult to prove a 
negative allegation than it is to establish an affirmative one.198 In 
support of this position, Saunders first successfully refutes the 
notion that it is always more difficult to establish a negative 
proposition by isolating and critiquing a particular category of 
statements. Specifically at issue are assertions (“unquantified 
statements of propositional logic”) that an individual entity has 
(or does not have) a particular property; for example: “X has 
blue eyes.”199 Clearly, there is nothing inherently more difficult 
in proving that X does not have blue eyes than there is in 
establishing that X does and, in fact, the type of proof put 
forward to advance either proposition might well be the same.200 
The second category of assertions identified, however, is 
more complex than the first and focuses on “quantified 
statements of predicate logic”—statements that involve assertions 
which relate to the characteristics of some or all entities.201 Those 
that relate to some entities (for example, “at least one person in 
town is a retired defense attorney”) are referred to as existential 
propositions; those that relate to all entities (“no one in town is a 
former prosecutor”) are referred to as universal propositions.202 
These types of assertions have more in common than belonging 
to the same class of logic; each is the opposite of the other, such 
that a universal proposition (one that is, by nature, generally 
more difficult to establish) is necessary to disprove its existential 
cousin and vice versa.203 The conclusion drawn by Saunders is 
that those “situations in which it is more difficult to prove a 
 
198. See Kevin W. Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 276 (1984). For Saunders, such a proposition is part of “legal folklore” and 
is supported by “logical fallacies.” Id. at 277. 
199. Id. at 280. 
200. See id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 280–81. 
203. See id. at 283, n.29. For example, to disprove the existential proposition that at 
least one person in town is a former defense attorney, one must prove the universal 
proposition that no one in town is such; to disprove the universal proposition that no 
one in town is a former prosecutor, one must merely establish the existential statement 
that one person is. Id. at 281. 
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negation do not have to do with the negation but with the 
difference in difficulty between proving universal and existential 
propositions in predicate logic.”204 
Thus, in shifting the burden to the party who has to prove 
the affirmative or lightening the burden of the party who must 
establish the negative, courts are actually leveling the playing 
field between those who bear the burden of establishing an 
existential proposition (which requires a finite amount of 
information) and those whose onus involves establishing its 
(likely more taxing) universal cousin. This is an interesting 
argument, particularly in light of the fact that the case law 
analyzed by Saunders appears to bear out his proposition.205 The 
approach also appears to be a “clean” one206 that would not 
involve the convoluted rules often employed in an attempt to 
iron out the perceived disparities in burden allocation when 
negative allegations are at issue.207 Moreover, by adopting the 
touted approach, those responsible for establishing unquantified 
statements of propositional logic (allegations no more inherently 
difficult to prove than their affirmative counterparts) would not 
be unfairly absolved of their evidentiary responsibilities. 
Saunders’ observations, however, are not ones that fit neatly 
into the context of the “negative” requirement for provisional 
release at the ICTY. What must be proved falls neither squarely 
into the category of unquantified statements of propositional 
logic nor that of quantified statements of predicate logic; 
 
204. Kevin W. Saunders, What Logic Can and Cannot Tell Us About the Law, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 667, 677 (1998). 
205. See Saunders, supra note 198, at 283–288. 
206. Id. at 283 (“A recognition by courts of where the difficulty of proof actually 
resides would help prevent the granting of legally (and logically) impermissible 
concessions to parties facing the supposed difficulties of proving a negative.”). 
207. Consider, for example, the “rule” governing burden allocation that was 
delineated by the U. S. Supreme Court in United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co.: 
When a negative is averred in pleading, or plaintiff’s case depends upon the 
establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally 
within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party 
averring the negative; but when the opposite party must, from the nature of 
the case, himself be in possession of full and plenary proof to disprove the 
negative averment, and the other party is not in possession of such proof, then 
it is manifestly just and reasonable that the party which is in possession of the 
proof should be required to adduce it; or, upon his failure to do so, we must 
presume it does not exist, which of itself establishes a negative. 
191 U.S. 84, 92 (1903). 
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establishing that an accused will not pose a danger to any person 
while released seems, in this respect, neither Saunders’ fish nor 
his fowl. One reason for this is that what is at issue is an uncertain 
property. Saunders considers what happens when one is required 
to prove something that is or was, not a future event that may (or 
may not) come to pass. At first blush, then, one might conclude 
that his observations are not inclined to contribute to the burden 
of proof debate regarding provisional release at the ICTY. 
Yet one ought not to subscribe to such a narrow view with 
regard to analogical reasoning; the necessary element involved is 
not uniformity but, rather, similarity. Thus, setting aside for the 
moment the difficulty inherent in accurately predicting future 
conduct, one must look more carefully at Saunders’ argument 
and consider the logical property that is the hinge upon which it 
turns. Saunders isolates the encumbrance that dictates the 
assignment of proof as one that relates not to the affirmative or 
negative value of a pleading, but rather its “type of 
quantification,”208 or, whether the pleading itself requires 
universal rather than finite or unquantified proof. 
It is in this regard that one must consider the “negative” 
provisional release prong. What must an accused prove in order 
to successfully establish that he will not pose a danger to any 
victim, witness or other person whilst released? Arguably, the 
possibilities are endless in number and incredibly difficult to 
establish. The accused bears the “universal” burden of 
establishing that he will not likely do anything that may harm any 
person if released and, in this respect, allocating an accused-
based burden fails from a Saunders-defined fairness perspective. 
In contrast to the accused’s “universal” burden of 
establishing that he will not likely do anything that may harm 
anyone is the alternative: a prosecutorial burden in which all that 
is required is the demonstration that an accused will likely do 
something that will endanger someone. This “something” need only 
be one thing—a finite piece of evidence indicating that an 
accused has the propensity to act as a danger to a victim, witness 
or other person if released.209 Thus, Saunders’ dissolution of “the 
mythic difficulty in proving a negative” does nothing to alter the 
 
208. Saunders, supra note 198, at 281–82. 
209. It is submitted that only specific accusations should suffice. See Tribe, supra 
note 80, at 394–95. 
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misplacement of the burden for establishing the “negative” 
element in cases of provisional release. 
Moreover, in the face of establishing a universal and future 
proposition, it is fair to ask how those seeking release are meant 
to rise to the challenge. Presumably, an accused can put forth 
general evidence of a good character and peaceful nature, but it 
is fair to question how much weight will be given to such 
assertions made by an accused war criminal and those close to 
him. For Tribe, such a burden is Kafka-esque, more for its 
amorphous nature than owing to the fact that what is at issue is 
future conduct; as he observes, an accused “will be able to offer 
nothing more than general assurances of his own good 
intentions.”210 Moreover, despite the difficulty inherent in 
substantiating the universal proposition required, it is likely that 
those accused are wary of proffering every bit of evidence that 
might support a motion for release. Given the pressure upon the 
tribunals to expedite their proceedings211 it would seem a poor 
trial strategy for an accused to invoke the ire of the three-
member panel that will later adjudicate guilt and, if a conviction 
is rendered, determine the appropriate sentence. In light of all 
of this, it is not surprising that, in bearing this “negative” burden, 
“there is little that [an accused before the tribunals] can do but 
give the appropriate undertaking and point to such things as the 
absence on his part of any significant political support through 
which such interference could be directed.”212 
Of course, this does little to advance the tribunal in what is 
presumed and hoped to be its goal of rendering “more informed 
decision[s]” through access to the best, most pertinent 
evidence.213 For much of the reasons illustrated to this point, 
 
210. Id. at 393 (drawing a parallel to Franz Kafka’s The Trial (1925)). 
211. See William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal 
Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Creation of 
the State Court in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSN’L L. 279, 282 (2008) 
(remarking upon the ICTY’s Completion Strategy, devised “in response to pressure from 
donor states to wrap up the work of the Tribunal”); see also, A Critical Look at Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ Completion Strategy: Open Questions and Prospects for the Future, 6 J.INT’L. CRIM. 
JUST. 681, 682–83 (2008) (including a dialogue in which ICTY Judge O-Gon Kwon 
remarks upon how the pressures of time have impacted “the [tribunal’s] legacy of 
procedural and evidentiary rules and the conception of due process”). 
212. Prosecutor v. Šainović & Ojdanić, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on 
Provisional Release, ¶ 72 (Oct. 30, 2002) (Hunt, J., dissenting). 
213. Jeffrey L. Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 291 (1997). 
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Judge Hunt grapples with—and struggles to keep intact—the 
tribunal’s (mis)assignment of the burden of proof with regard to 
this element of Rule 65(B). While maintaining that the onus of 
establishing the future conduct of the accused with regard to 
victims and witnesses is one borne by the accused, he is unable to 
ignore the inadequacies of this approach: the limited evidence 
that an accused can proffer and the unfairness inherent in 
unsupported, prosecutorial assertions alluding to a possibility of 
victim or witness tampering put forth in a manner too vague for 
an accused to refute.214 
3. Arbitrary Detention and the Burden of Proof 
Additional difficulties arise when one considers the merit of 
an accused-based burden alongside the relationship between the 
right to release and arbitrary detention. As noted in the above 
discussion regarding international standards in the area of 
provisional release, a domestic accused may bring a claim before 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee on the authority of ICCPR 
article 9(3). Yet, as illustrated in the 2005 case of Morais v. 
Angola,215 applicants are not so limited in bringing claims relating 
to their detention. In Morais, the Human Rights Committee 
considered the forty-day detention of an accused who was 
ultimately charged with defamation.216 Of relevance to this 
inquiry is the complainant’s successful 9(1) claim, a subarticle 
that prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention and which applies to 
all forms of detention (not just those of a criminal nature).217 In 
asserting a 9(1) violation, the author of the communication 
maintained that, even if his arrest was lawful, “his continued 
detention for a period of 40 days was neither reasonable nor 
 
214. Šainović & Ojdanić, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 72 (Oct. 30, 2002) 
(Hunt, J., dissenting). 
215. HRC, Communication No. 1128/2002: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Morais v. Angola), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (Apr. 18, 2005) 
[hereinafter Morais]. 
216. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.9. 
217. ICCPR, supra note 23, at art. 9(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention . . . .”). 
Given his relatively limited period of detention, the author of the communication did 
not assert a violation of article 9(3) based upon a failure to be tried within a reasonable 
time, although he did avail (successfully) of the provision insofar as he was not brought 
promptly before a judicial official. Morais, supra note 215, ¶ 6.3. 
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necessary in the circumstances of his case.”218 Consistent with its 
prior decisions, the committee held that its interpretation of 
arbitrary expands beyond that which is merely unlawful219 and, 
importantly, detention is not arbitrary only when it is reasonable 
and necessary in the circumstances.220 In illuminating those 
factors that may comprise that which is reasonable and necessary, 
the committee’s decision then specifically notes the issues of risk 
of flight, evidence tampering, and prevention of crime.221 These 
three enumerated factors are, of course, most frequently 
associated with release matters brought pursuant to subarticle 
9(3).222 
At first blush, the decision appears an interesting one, as the 
time that the accused spent in detention is unquestionably 
shorter than that which normally gives rise to a successful article 
9(3)application.223 One might think, then, that the value of the 
decision lies in the fact that it opens the door for a greater 
number of successful claims as regards rights violations related to 
pretrial detention. This appears to be so, and the decision may 
 
218. Morais, supra note 215, ¶ 3.1. 
219. Id. ¶ 6.1.This is consistent with the viewpoint of some of the drafters. As the 
Report of the Third Committee reveals, some states considered the term arbitrary to 
mean “contrary to law” while others viewed the term in a broader sense, so as to 
encompass acts that violated justice or reason or had other like negative attributes. Draft 
International Covenants on Human Rights, 1 U.N. GAOR, 13th. Sess., Annex, Agenda 
Item 49, U.N. Doc. A/4045 (1958); Report of the Third Committee, §49, in BOSSUYT, 
supra note 32, at 201. 
220. Morais, supra note 215, ¶ 6.1. This is consistent with the committee’s prior 
decisions. See, e.g., HRC, Communication No. 305/1988: Views of the Human Rights 
Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Van Alphen v. Netherlands), ¶ 5.8, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Mar. 29, 1989) (interpreting “not arbitrary” as requiring 
that detention be reasonable and necessary “in all the circumstances,” and noting that 
necessity may be established in cases where the accused may abscond, tamper with 
evidence or engage in recidivist criminal activity). This approach is also in accord with 
Nowak’s contention that “the prohibition of arbitrariness is to be interpreted broadly.” 
NOWAK, supra note 27, at 225. 
221. Morais, ¶ 6.1. 
222. See, e.g., HRC, Communication No. 432/1990: Decision on Admissability (W.B.E. v. 
Netherlands), ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/46/D/432/1990 (Oct. 23, 1992). 
223. See, e.g., HRC, Communication No. 908/2000: Views Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, 
of the Optional Protocol (Evans v. Trinidad & Tobago), ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/77/D/908/2000 (May 5, 2003) (finding a violation from 27 months of 
detention); HRC, Communication No. 704/1996: Views Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the 
Optional Protocol (Shaw v. Jamaica), ¶ 7.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/623/D/704/1996 (June 4, 
1998) (reaching the same conclusion in an application citing 27 months of pretrial 
detention). 
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well have a positive effect in the resolution of subsequent pretrial 
detention cases brought before the Human Rights Committee. 
However, the import of the decision extends beyond this issue 
when considered in conjunction with the allocation of the 
burden of proof in applications for release. 
In Morais, the Human Rights Committee establishes that, if a 
state fails to invoke an element that illustrates the reasonableness 
and necessity of detention, detention is arbitrary. In interpreting 
this jurisprudence, one must assume that the committee did not 
intend that its decision, and the action it calls for, to be without 
value. Accordingly, it would make no sense if a state could satisfy 
its responsibility to demonstrate the factor (or factors) that 
justifies detention by mere lip service. Such a “requirement” 
would render the committee’s ruling, and “state compliance,” 
meaningless. Rather, it follows that it must be “the government’s 
burden to prove that detention is necessary, not the individual’s 
burden to prove that release is justified” in order to ensure that it 
is not arbitrary.224 This protection of the right to liberty, often 
embodied in constitutional form, ensures the value of the 
safeguard of judicial review in cases of detention.225 
The question therefore becomes: how can these facts rest 
comfortably alongside an accused-based burden of proof in 
matters of provisional release? It is submitted that they simply 
cannot. Rather, the procedural protection of judicial review is 
undermined by the tribunal’s method of operation that 
effectively shifts the burden to the accused to establish that his 
detention is arbitrary. The ICTY RPE should not be set up in 
such a manner so as to facilitate the prosecution (the executive) 
in impinging upon the rights of the accused without ensuring 
meaningful judicial review. As a result, the tribunal’s approach 
affords insufficient respect for the right to liberty and sets a poor 
example to the world at large. It is, quite simply, not 
representative of the enlightened manner in which the U.N. 
ought to administer justice.226 
 
224. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 341–43 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
225. See Zamir v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9174/80, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 108, 113 
(1986) (“If it were otherwise, there can be no doubt that the protection afforded to 
detained persons by the requirement of judicial control of the legality of the detention 
would be substantially weakened.”). 
226. That such a practice is essentially in accord with that available to those 
detained at Guantanamo Bay should create some perspective for the unacceptability of 
  
1148 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1101 
One may be inclined to contest this conclusion by citing to 
domestic jurisdictions that allow for a reverse onus in pretrial 
release matters. Canada, for instance, employs an outright 
accused-based burden in certain types of cases,227 and the 
American Bail Reform Act228 provides for what some have 
deemed the functional equivalent of an accused-based burden in 
select matters.229 Yet, as is illustrated by the example of 
Mauritius,230 domestic practice does not enjoy a per se 
imprimatur of “best practice”; in fact, its compliance with that 
which is dictated by international standards and obligations can 
by no means be assumed.231 Indeed, “no country appears to 
handle the problem of pre-trial detention with as much restraint 
as might be expected in view of the constitutional and statutory 
law on the subject and the gravity of the measure.”232  
Such is the case in each of the selected examples in which 
the shift in the burden of proof represents an abandonment of 
 
this approach. See, e.g, Perkins, supra note 137, at 457–58 (noting a relevant petitioner 
must “prove the legality of his liberty[,] . . . eviscerating the fundamental premise of the 
writ of habeas corpus: that he who detains is charged with proving the legality of the 
detention”). 
227. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C46, § 515(6) (1985) (imposing an 
accused-based burden when the accused is charged with an indictable offense while on 
release for an earlier indictable charge). The code goes on to mandate that “the justice 
shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he is dealt with according to 
law, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows 
cause why his detention in custody is not justified.” Id. 
228. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006) (establishing two separate rebuttable 
presumptions against release, depending upon such factors as the criminal history of the 
accused, the type of crime charged and whether the current offence is alleged to have 
been committed while the accused was on pretrial release). 
229. See, e.g., Robert S. Natalini, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness 
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 250 (1985). Interestingly, 
former President George W. Bush’s interpretation of the Act (contrary to its plain 
language) is not even this generous. Despite the fact that the Act provides for a hearing 
in each case, Bush asserted, “Today, people charged with certain crimes, including some 
drug offenses, are not eligible for bail . . . .” Remarks at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Academy in Quantico, Virginia, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1190, 1194 
(Sept. 10, 2003). One must hope that President Bush’s interpretation reflects a 
misapprehension of the law and is not representative of its practical application. 
230. Supra notes 215–25. 
231. See, e.g., David M. Paciocco, Pragmatism, Legal Culture, and the Protection of 
Rights and Freedoms, 8 CAN. CRIM. L.R. 5, 8–10 (2003) (lamenting various aspects of the 
present day legal culture in Canada). 
232. MUELLER & LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, supra note 156, at 101. Although this 
observation is nearly forty years old, it is submitted that its potency remains intact, 
particularly in light of the domestic trend noted in the following paragraph. 
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the government’s responsibility to establish the reasonableness 
and necessity of detention as dictated by the Human Rights 
Committee’s interpretation of ICCPR article 9(1) in Morais. 
Moreover, the Canadian and U.S. examples illustrate the 
inescapable erosion of civil liberties in contemporary domestic 
systems of justice when the decision is made to sideline the rights 
of accused individuals in order to curry political favor with the 
voting public.233 International obligations appear to have taken a 
backseat as societies become increasingly receptive to historically 
unjustified restraints on liberty in the name of collective 
security,234 a trap that the tribunal ought to have avoided. 
Rather, it ought to be incumbent upon the tribunal’s 
prosecutor to provide evidence that indicates the reasonableness 
and necessity of detention, such as risk of flight or that an 
accused would frustrate justice by engaging in evidence 
tampering or witness intimidation if released. This is a necessary 
factor, not only insofar as the issue of arbitrary detention is 
concerned; it also establishes that detention is not punitive, but 
an administrative necessity.235 Furthermore, as Tribe avers, due 
 
233. Similarly, those who sought to shield the Republic of South Africa’s reverse-
onus provision in bail proceedings from constitutional challenge prevailed in the 
drafting of that country’s constitution. See Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s 
Final Constitution from a Human Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 78 (1999) 
(noting that the attempt could be attributed to “anticriminal public sentiment” and that 
the reverse onus provisions undermine the presumption of innocence and the right to 
liberty and are discriminatory toward unrepresented defendants). An extensive 
discussion as to whether a state can meet its obligation of establishing the 
reasonableness and necessity of detention in a given case through certain statutory 
restrictions is beyond the scope of this inquiry. It is submitted, however, that limiting the 
burden shift in release matters to certain types of cases insufficiently addresses the 
concerns raised with regard to meaningful judicial review of such matters. 
234. See Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pre-Trial 
Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 327 (1994). Police Commissioner Ken Moroney of New 
South Wales illustrates this disturbing issue well when he defended a plan that would 
have the state police monitoring magistrate’s bail decisions because the police and 
community were tired of having their efforts to clean up the streets undone by the 
release of accused individuals: “I have an obligation to the people of New South Wales, 
not only to prevent and detect crime, but equally as important, to reduce the fear of crime, 
and I think there is an element of fear within the community when people are 
continually allowed bail and continue to re-offend.” Hamish Fitzsimmons, Police to 
Monitor the Granting of Bail in NSW, ABC Radio (Jan. 6, 2003), transcript available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s758229.htm (second emphasis added). 
235. Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 577, 577 (2003) (“To presume that an accused is innocent means, 
among other things, that punishment cannot begin until the accused is convicted. Thus, 
detention must serve some other distinguishable goal.”). 
  
1150 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1101 
process necessitates that this showing be particularized,236 a 
position that is also aligned with Saunders’ analysis of burden 
allocation; unquantified statements of propositional logic involve 
the establishment of specific attributes of particular properties, 
not vague assertions or generalizations.237 Moreover, especially 
with regard to the second prong of Rule 65(B), this is a 
preferable approach from the standpoint of judicial economy. 
Contrary to the assumption that it will save time to assume the 
necessity of detention, requiring an accused to satisfy the court of 
the universal proposition that he will not be a danger to any 
person is an exercise that is neither efficient nor just. 
4. Relevance of Institutional Shortcomings 
This is not to say, however, that the limitations of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, specifically, the lack of a police force and 
consequent inability to monitor the activities of an accused while 
released (and to effectuate his arrest as necessary), do not have a 
role to play in provisional release determinations. Here, a 
domestic analogy is useful. In municipal systems, pretrial 
supervision is an essential element of pretrial release; it not only 
enables a judicial official to rest comfortably in the fact that the 
conditions set out for bail are meaningful and enforceable, but 
also fosters public confidence in the system of release.238 
Of course, it is not easy to always fall within this idyllic 
paradigm: domestic systems routinely suffer from inadequate 
resources with which to monitor compliance with bail 
conditions.239 Perhaps as a result, the United States has 
incorporated a mechanism of third party monitoring in its system 
of provisional release240 that, in practice, requires an accused to 
 
236. Tribe, supra note 80, at 396. 
237. See supra notes 198–207. 
238. See James R. Marsh, Performing Pre-trial Services: A Challenge in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System, 58 FED. PROBATION 3 (1994). 
239. See, e.g., Esmond Harmsworth, Bail and Detention: an Assessment and Critique of 
the Federal and Massachusetts Systems, N. ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 250 
(1996); THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL, FACING JUSTICE: TACKLING 
DEFENDANTS’ NON-ATTENDANCE AT COURT, 2003-4, H.C. 1162, ¶ 2.15 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.nao.org.uk/idoc.ashx?docId=a65320da-80fe-4576-acb0-03e1316c5bb5
&version=-1. 
240. See 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (permitting the court to require as a 
condition of release that a defendant “remain in the custody of a designated person, 
who agrees to supervise him and to report any violation of a release condition to the 
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find and designate such a person to be responsible for him.241 
Interestingly, this procedure is seemingly akin to ancient bail 
practices that permitted an accused “to either pay a money bail or 
have friends and relatives swear surety that the accused would appear 
for trial.”242 Similarly, ICTY practice provides a parallel in what is 
its de facto requirement of a state guarantee243 and, it is 
submitted, the obligation of an accused to secure the same 
adequately addresses the difficulties that arise from the tribunal’s 
institutional limitations.244 
5. Practical Allocation of the Burden of Proof 
Having established the shortcomings of asserting an 
accused-based burden of proof, it makes sense to now look 
beyond the rule as written and assess its practical application. As 
Judge Wald notes, early ICTY jurisprudence regarding the two 
prongs of Rule 65(B) is “technically gratuitous or dicta,” as trial 
chambers did not need to discuss the application of the rule after 
 
Court, if the designated person is able reasonably to assure the judicial officer that the 
person will appear as required and will not pose a danger to the safety of any other 
person or the community”). 
241. See, e.g., United States v. Dobson, No. 87-1222-01-P, 1987 WL 11147, at *6 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 13, 1987) (involving an accused who “proposed” his sister as a third party 
custodian and called her to the stand to provide the court with the personal information 
in order to qualify her for the position). 
242. Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 401 (emphasis added); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 
U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons 
to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the 
deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the 
presence of an accused.”). 
243. These are guarantees from a state (or, sometimes, an entity) which indicate 
the state’s willingness to accept and monitor the accused while released and to secure 
his return to the tribunal. This issue is considered in greater detail infra at Part III.E.2. 
244. The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) may be charting a different, more 
accused-friendly, approach in this regard. The intent to do so is evidenced in the now 
overturned Bemba release decision, which aimed to facilitate the process of finding a 
state willing to accept the accused. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 89–90 (Aug. 14, 
2009). The subsequent appeal judgment is less straightforward on the matter. While it 
notes that conditional release may not be granted without first identifying a state willing 
to accept the accused, it does not specify the party responsible for acquiring the state’s 
consent and notes that the ICC is dependent upon the state’s cooperation as to 
accepting the individual. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA2, Judgment on the 
Appeal of the Prosecutor, ¶¶ 104–09 (Dec. 2, 2009). 
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finding the absence of exceptional circumstances.245 From the 
pre-amendment cases, however, Judge Wald perceived the 
indication to be that, if put to prove that he or she would appear 
for trial and would not cause a danger to any person while 
released, an accused person’s burden would be essentially 
unqualified.246 In support of this conclusion, she notes the Blaškić 
court’s position (in light of the tribunal’s discovery process): “the 
knowledge which, as an accused person, he has of the evidence 
produced by the Prosecutor would place him in a situation 
permitting him to exert pressure on victims and witnesses and 
that the investigation of the case might be seriously flawed.”247 
The early days of post-amendment jurisprudence did not 
seem much brighter for those accused insofar as the issue of 
burden of proof in provisional release matters was concerned. 
Just one month after the exceptional circumstances requirement 
was removed, a number of motions for release were denied for 
those involved in the Kupreškić case. The decisions denying 
release were short and absent of elaboration. In one instance, the 
trial chamber acknowledged the voluntary surrender of the 
accused, the fact that written assurances of arrest and deliverance 
had been tendered from the authorities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a long-term detention of more than two years, and 
compliance with a prior short-term release for bereavement.248 
Despite these factors, in the final paragraph of the three 
paragraph decision, the trial chamber concluded that it was “not 
satisfied that the accused would not try to interfere with the 
 
245. Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 241; see also Prosecutor v. Drljača & 
Kovačević, Case No. IT-97-24, Decision on Defence Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 
26–27 (Jan. 20, 1998) (finding the defendant’s submission that, if released, he would not 
pose a danger to others insufficient, although providing no indication that any evidence 
had been put forth indicating the contrary). 
246. Wald & Martinez, supra note 35, at 241. 
247. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision Rejecting a Request for 
Provisional Release, ¶ 21 (Apr. 25, 1996). These words have subsequently been oft-
quoted by the Prosecution in its opposition to provisional release motions, despite never 
again being popularly endorsed by the Tribunal. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brđanin & Talić, 
Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Motion by Radoslav Brđanin for Provisional Release, ¶ 
19 (July 25, 2000) (rejecting the conclusion as “strange logic”). 
248. See Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16, Decision on the Motion for 
Provisional Release by the Accused Drago Josipović of 21 December 1999, ¶ 2 (Dec. 22, 
1999). 
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witnesses and victims, and that he would appear for the delivery 
of judgment.”249 
This is a troubling decision from a burden of proof 
perspective and one that seems to bear out all of the concerns 
raised above. The prosecution, it seems, offered no evidence that 
the accused would pose a danger to victims and witnesses and the 
accused raised a number of presumably pertinent, positive 
factors to no avail. One might then be inclined to wonder how an 
accused could ever meet his burden. Yet, a relevant but 
unmentioned factor, and one which undoubtedly affected the 
tribunal’s decision, was the fact that the Kupreškić trial had then 
been ongoing for more than a year. Moreover, as time would 
later reveal, ICTY accused would not always be put to the test of 
proving the amorphous negative of non-dangerousness in 
pretrial matters. 
a. Dangerousness Prong 
i. Tacit Prosecutorial Burden 
In this respect, it can be noted that, in disposing of a 
number of more recent requests for provisional release, each 
ICTY trial chamber has at one point or another implicitly 
assigned a prosecutorial burden of proof as regards the 
dangerousness prong of the provisional release rule. Despite 
giving token approval to an accused-based burden in Ljubičić,250 
Trial Chamber I went on to find that the dangerousness of the 
accused had not been established, as there was no evidence 
indicative of the accused having interfered with justice. Of 
particular importance, the chamber blatantly rejected the Blaskić 
conclusion above, noting that unsupported suggestions by the 
prosecution predicting possible danger to victims or witnesses 
upon the release of the accused are insufficient.251 Likewise, the 
panel has concluded more than once that, in order to find 
 
249. Id. ¶ 3. 
250. Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision on Second Application 
for Provisional Release, ¶ 17 (July 26, 2005) (reaffirming that the burden of proof is 
upon the accused to satisfy that he will not pose a danger to persons while on release). 
251. Id. ¶ 29.  
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against an application for release pursuant to victim or witness 
concerns, “concrete” danger must be shown.252 
Responding to prosecutorial objections, the Appeals 
Chamber has rejected the argument that the practical effect of 
the foregoing is a shift in the allocation of the burden of proof, 
citing the lower court’s consideration of such other evidence as 
the conduct of the accused while knowingly under investigation 
and the prospect of available supervision upon release.253 
Interestingly, in considering the matter, the higher court alleges 
that the accused had met his persuasive burden regarding the 
negative prong of Rule 65(B) and that the prosecution then 
failed to rebut the evidence accepted by the trial chamber in this 
regard.254 This position, however, appears somewhat 
disingenuous, as the language from the initial decision that is 
cited by the ICTY Appeals Chamber to buttress its claim points, 
in fact, to an opposite conclusion.255 
Yet, even if one accepts the appeals chamber’s assessment as 
true, the approach is a problematic one from the perspective of 
both fairness and judicial economy. This is not a situation that 
involves a legal presumption256 and, accordingly, it will be a 
guessing game for the prosecution as to whether it is required in 
 
252. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Order on Provisional 
Release of Berislav Pušić, ¶ 29 (July 30, 2004). The related decisions of Pusić’s co-
accused reflect a similar conclusion. See Prlić, Order on Provisional Release of Bruno 
Stović, ¶ 27 (July 30, 2004); Prlić, Order on Provisional Release of Jadranko Prlić, ¶¶ 22, 
28 (July 30, 2004); Prlić, Order on Provisional Release of Milivoj Petković, ¶ 27 (July 30, 
2004); Prlić, Order on Provisional Release of Slobodan Praljak, ¶ 28 (July 30, 2004); 
Prlić, Order on Provisional Release of Valentin Ćorić, ¶ 28 (July 30, 2004). 
253. See Prlić, Decision on Motions for Reconsideration, Clarification, Request for 
Release, and Applications for Leave to Appeal, ¶ 26 (Sept. 8, 2004) (describing the trial 
chamber’s examination as “detailed” and also including an assessment of the area in 
which the accused would reside). 
254. See id. ¶ 28. 
255. See Prlić, Order on Provisional Release of Berislav Pušić, ¶ 29 (July 30, 2004) 
(“Considering that no suggestion has been made that the Accused has interfered with 
the administration of justice since the Indictment was confirmed against him, the 
Prosecution’s suggestion that, if released, the Accused may pose a danger to witnesses 
and victims is insufficiently supported by the evidence. No concrete danger has been 
identified. The assessment under Rule 65 cannot be done in abstracto.”). 
256. Presumptions of law are judge-made (or statutory) rules, which require, once 
certain factual foundations have been laid, that particular conclusions are to be drawn. 
COLIN TAPPER, CROSS & TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 148 (11th ed. 2007). The application of a 
presumption makes it incumbent upon the party against whom it operates to make an 
evidentiary showing lest it suffer an adverse ruling. See, e.g., Note, A Survey of Procedural 
Presumptions in the District of Columbia Part I, 45. GEO. L.J. 410, 422 (1957). 
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a given case to put on evidence with regard to the asserted 
accused-based burden. Moreover, the approach is not universally 
employed, offending the principle that like cases ought to be 
treated alike. In addition, in the interest of fairness, the approach 
necessitates that a relevant accused then be afforded the 
opportunity to respond to the prosecutor’s accusations, in turn 
contributing to the overall length of the proceedings.257  
Similar to the approach noted above, Trial Chamber III 
seems to impose a “shared burden,” taking into account the 
institutional shortcomings of the tribunals by requiring the 
combined personal undertaking of the accused and state 
guarantees that will ensure compliance with the conditions set by 
the Tribunal. The concurrent requirement is implicitly that of 
the prosecution, as the chamber remarked on the “absence of 
any suggestion that the Accused has interfered with the 
administration of justice in any way since the date when the 
indictment was confirmed against him.”258 Similarly, in a later 
matter, the same trial chamber concluded that, as to the 
“dangerousness” prong, in the absence of any positive evidence 
adduced by the prosecution, “it is difficult to see that a Trial 
Chamber could do other than conclude that the Accused will not 
pose such a danger.”259 
 
257. Although outside the scope of this discussion, it is fair to question the value, in 
some cases, of being given the chance to respond. Consider, for example, a matter 
recently considered by Trial Chamber II in which the accused had to counter the 
assertions of intimidation made by two anonymous witnesses and a third allegation of 
interference contained in a sealed U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(“UNMIK”) file to which he was denied access as well as its executive summary. 
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Further Decision on Lahi Brahimaj’s 
Motion for Provisional Release (May 3, 2006). 
258. Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Second 
Application for Provisional Release, ¶ 24 (Apr. 14, 2005). Trial Chamber III made 
identical, contemporaneous findings with regard to Multinović’s co-accused and had 
earlier availed itself of a similar argument in granting the release of Simatovic. 
Prosecutor v. Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 32 
(July 28, 2004). 
259. Milutinović, Decision on Nebojša Pavković’s Application for Provisional 
Release, ¶ 12 (Apr. 14, 2005) (advocating for a prosecutorial onus regarding both the 
absconding and dangerousness prongs). Notably, this aspect of Tribunal case-law has 
recently been endorsed by the ICC. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 72 (Aug. 14, 2009). 
(citing ICTY release decisions in the cases of Haradinaj and Prlić in support of its 
decision to reject the prosecution’s “general allegation” and “general concern” 
regarding victim safety upon the release of the accused). 
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It seems, then, that these approaches take into 
consideration some of the concerns noted above, in particular, 
that it is unfair to require that an accused prove a universal 
proposition and that due process requires a particularized 
showing as regards detention, rather than vague suppositions or 
generalizations. Whether the implicit prosecutorial burden 
makes any real inroads on the unfairness associated with an 
accused-based burden remains to be seen. For example, consider 
the issue of the standard of proof: if “any evidence” will enable 
the prosecution to meet its burden as to the potential danger 
posed by an accused, this calls into question whether a real 
benefit derives from the tacit burden allocation.260 Moreover, one 
must bear in mind that these approaches fail to address every 
problem associated with an accused-based burden and, 
additionally, are not uniformly employed at the tribunal. 
ii. Conflicting Jurisprudence 
Those cases that implicitly assign a prosecutorial burden as 
an aspect of Rule 65(B) must be considered alongside post-
amendment jurisprudence in which it is asserted that the 
prosecution bears no evidentiary burden to demonstrate that 
provisional release is inappropriate.261 Relevant in this respect is a 
2005 case in which, despite the fact that prosecutorial assertions 
that the accused had intimidated or threatened witnesses had not 
been verified, a trial chamber decided that:  
[I]n the absence of any other significant factor indicating 
that he will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other 
person, if released, the Accused has not discharged his 
burden of proof to satisfy the Trial Chamber that the second 
requirement of Rule 65(B) of the Rules has been met.262 
Similarly, even in cases in which it seems clear that the 
prosecution is required to make some contribution towards 
establishing the negative requirement of Rule 65(B), some trial 
chambers are not above finding that the negative prong of Rule 
 
260. This issue is addressed in greater detail infra at Part III.D. 
261. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Haradin 
Bala’s Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 40 (Oct. 31, 2003). 
262. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision on Lahi Brahimaj’s 
Motion for Provisional Release, at 6 (Nov. 3, 2005). 
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65 has not been met in the wake of little more than prosecutorial 
conjecture.263  
While cases such as those noted in the preceding paragraph 
appear to be the exception and not the rule,264 this does not 
address the problem of disparate treatment of like cases. 
Moreover, simply because the majority of ICTY practice limits the 
inherent unfairness of the rule as drafted does render the 
respective provisions harmless.265 First, in fairness to both the 
prosecution and defense, the rules ought to faithfully reflect 
tribunal activity. Parties should be clearly and honestly informed 
as to their proof obligations. In addition, the approach is for 
another reason unfair and inefficient: by being compelled to 
refute the possibility of harm to victims or witnesses before any 
evidence has been advanced regarding the same, time, energy, 
and resources will be directed towards establishing an element 
which the accused may not actually bear the burden of proving 
and, consequently, diverted from meeting his or her legitimate 
obligations. 
Allocating the burden of proof regarding this aspect of rule 
65 to the prosecution, on the other hand, would dovetail with 
Saunders’ universal/finite allocation assessment266 and 
 
263. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Defence 
Motion for Provisional Release (July 23, 2004); Prosecutor v. Mrđa, Case No. IT-02-59-
PT, Decision on Darko Mrđa’s Request for Provisional Release (Apr. 15, 2003). 
Although the latter matter was likely decided on the fact that the accused failed to 
proffer a state guarantee, the trial chamber chose to make an in abstracto finding as to 
the negative prong of Rule 65 rather than, it seems, the absence of a guarantee. Mrđa, 
Decision on Darko Mrđa’s Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 39. 
264. Trial Chamber II has also imposed a tacit obligation on the prosecution as 
regards the “dangerousness” prong. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-
PT, Decision on Drago Nikolić’s Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 27 (Nov. 9, 2005) 
(concluding that “[n]ot having received any information from the Prosecution that 
would substantiate an opposite conclusion, the Trial Chamber does not see any reason 
to doubt that the Accused has never posed a danger to any victim, witness or any other 
person who may appear before the Tribunal, or that he would not do so if he were to be 
provisionally released”); see also Gaynor, supra note 110, at 196 (offering the opinion 
that the accused-based burden in rule 65(B) remains the formal position, but that “the 
onus in practice shifts to the prosecution”). 
265. This is also part of a recurring issue that, in part, relates back to the 
observation that the limitations of the ad hoc instruments create a burden upon the 
judiciary to ensure the fair trial that is not necessarily assured by the rules. It is 
particularly troubling when considered in light of the precedential effect of ad hoc 
activity. The RPE standing alone should assure a fair proceeding; it is not enough that 
this objective may be met by judicial correction. 
266. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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Wigmore’s observation that burden allocation ought to 
correspond with fairness considerations. 267 It would bring the 
tribunal in line with a burden of proof that is dictated by recent 
jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee. 268 
Moreover, a prosecutorial burden would create a framework 
more worthy of serving as precedent by limiting the spectrum of 
evidence placed before the overburdened court, placing the 
prosecution on clear notice that it is required to adduce 
evidence, and resulting in a scenario wherein an accused is 
clearly informed of the allegations that he must address. 
b. External Effect of Tribunal Jurisprudence and Practice 
In light of the issues raised in relation to burden allocation 
at the tribunal, one must consider the carry-on effect of ICTY 
practice in this area. It is not difficult to imagine that an accused-
based burden in release matters, despite all of the problems 
noted with the same, may be adopted on the domestic, quasi-
international, or international level. In fact, such is already the 
case with regard to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has 
adopted, mutatis mutandis, the RPE of the ICTR269 (whose rules 
are virtually identical to those of the ICTY).270 While the ICC has 
opted not to follow the ICTY insofar as the latter makes 
detention the rule and allocates an accused-based burden of 
proof for release,271 the potential precedential effect of the 
ICTY’s accused based burden of proof in matters of release at 
other institutions remains. Indeed, at the Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), the co-
prosecutors in the Samphan case appear to question whether the 
relevant section in the Cambodian Procedure Code, which 
dictates that “as a rule, the Charged Person is to remain at 
liberty,” necessarily applies to release determinations at the 
 
267. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
269. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
145, art. 14(1). 
270. See supra note 5. 
271. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision 
on the Powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to Review Proprio Motu the Pretrial Detention of 
Germain Katanga (Mar. 18, 2008) (distinguishing the ICC approach to release from that 
of the ICTY by interpreting provisions of the ICC Statute to dictate that detention is an 
exceptional measure for which the posecution bears the burden of proof). 
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ECCC.272 In support of the conclusion that it does not, the co-
prosecutors cite ICTY precedent in which pretrial detention is 
the rule.273  
Further problems are likely to arise still, as the tribunal has 
not candidly (or consistently) addressed its modification of the 
rule in practice, so as to expressly create a prosecutorial burden 
with regard to the dangerousness prong. Thus, despite the fact 
that later courts are “not generally bound by the jurisprudence 
of other International Tribunals”274 they may well refer to 
tribunal cases and, in the field of provisional release, are at risk 
of taking the tribunal at face value, accepting the (it is submitted, 
disingenuous) assertion that the accused bears the entirety of the 
burden in provisional release matters.275 
 
272. Public Redacted Version of the “Co-Prosecutor’s Response to Khieu 
Samphan’s Appeal Brief Against the Order Refusing Request for Release Dated 28 
October 2008,” Filed on 22 January 2009, ¶¶ 7–8, Co-Prosecutors v. Samphan, Case No. 
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCD (PTC 14) (Jan. 28, 2009). The relevance of existing 
Cambodian procedure is beyond dispute. See Guido Acquaviva, New Paths in International 
Criminal Justice? The Internal Rules of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 6 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 129, 132 (2008) (“Since the [Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (“ECCC”)] are intended to form part of the domestic judiciary of Cambodia, 
existing Cambodian procedural law should in principle apply.”). As we have seen, the 
norm applied may in essence dictate burden allocation. 
273. Public Redacted Version of the “Co-Prosecutor’s Response to Khieu 
Samphan’s Appeal Brief Against the Order Refusing Request for Release Dated 28 
October 2008,” Filed on 22 January 2009, ¶ 8, Samphan (availing of case law from the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, which attributes the approach to the serious nature of 
the crimes charged, to justify this deviation from international standards). Note, 
however, that using ICTY precedent to “trump” the existing Cambodian procedural 
provision runs afoul of ECCC law. See Acquaviva, supra note 272, at 132 (“Articles 20, 23 
and 33 of the ECCC Law only allow for recourse to procedural rules established at the 
international level in case ‘existing procedure in force’ does not deal with certain 
matters. Article 12 of the Agreement adds that guidance may be sought in procedural 
rules established at the international level where (i) Cambodian Law does not deal with 
a particular matter, (ii) there is uncertainty regarding interpretation or application of 
Cambodian law or (iii) there is a question on the consistency of Cambodian law with 
international standards.”). 
274. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, Decision on the Motion by 
Morris Kallon for Bail, ¶ 32 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
275. While this represents an example of how the absence of candor in the 
Tribunal’s provisional release jurisprudence can work to the detriment of an accused, as 
the Bemba decision illustrates, this absence of candor in Tribunal decisions can also 
inure to the benefit of an accused. See infra note 298 and accompanying text. 
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D. Standard of Proof 
Having thus considered the issues raised by the allocation of 
the burden of proof in provisional release determinations, it 
makes sense to turn to the matter of the standard of proof: to 
what degree must the requirements of rule 65 be met? The 
answer is not apparent from the rule itself, which requires only 
that a trial chamber be “satisfied” that an accused will appear for 
trial and will not pose a danger to others before ordering 
release.276 In addition, the recently created ICTY Manual on 
Developed Practices offers no more enlightenment than the 
relevant rule.277 
The prosecution has repeatedly sought the application of a 
standard of proof greater than the balance of probabilities (i.e., 
preponderance of the evidence). In so doing it has advanced a 
number of arguments, such as that the trial chamber must be 
satisfied “that there is no real risk that the accused will fail to 
appear for trial,”278 that Rule 65(B) places a “substantial burden 
on the Accused to show that, if he is released, he will appear for 
trial and will not pose a danger to any witness, victim or other 
person,”279 and that the accused “must do more than simply tip 
the balance in his favour.”280 According to the prosecution, “the 
special circumstances in which [the] Tribunal operates warrant 
the application of a more onerous standard by a Trial Chamber 
 
276. See ICTY Rules, supra 179, R. 65(B); see also U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 
Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of Its Thirty-ninth Session (Vienna, 10–
14 November 2003), ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/545 (Dec. 8, 2003) (observing that 
satisfaction is “a neutral formulation of the standard of proof”); see also McIntyre, supra 
note 181, at 234, (identifying a clarity issue that extends beyond the relevant standard of 
proof: “[t]he exact nature of the burden which is placed upon an accused is unclear . . . 
[p]resumably . . . Rule 65(B) places a persuasive burden upon the accused in the sense 
that the accused not only has the obligation to adduce evidence to meet the 
requirements of the rule, but must also discharge a persuasive burden . . . .”). 
277. See ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, supra note 182, at 65 (confirming only 
burden allocation by noting that the criteria for release must be “satisfied” by the 
accused). 
278. Prosecution’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision to Grant 
Provisional Release, ¶ 14, Prosecutor v. Šainović & Ojdanić, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65 
(July 26, 2002). 
279. Confidential Reply of Haradin Bala to Prosecution’s Response to Motion for 
Provisional Release, ¶ 4, Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66T (July 25, 2003) 
(unpublished), quoted in Limaj, Decision on Provisional Release of Haradin Bala, at 4 
(Sept. 16, 2003). 
280. Prosecution’s Reponse to Applications for Provisional Release, ¶ 27, Sainović 
& Ojdanić (June 19, 2002). 
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when considering a motion for provisional release.”281 In effect, 
the prosecution has frequently asked for the institutional 
shortcomings of the tribunal to not only create an accused based 
burden of proof, but to render that burden more substantial. 
One of the decisions that appears to support the call for a 
heightened standard was delivered in the Brđanin case, in which 
Trial Chamber II avers that the ICTY’s institutional shortcomings 
“place a substantial burden upon any applicant for provisional 
release to satisfy the Trial Chamber that he will indeed appear 
for trial if released.”282 This decision was subsequently invoked by 
the prosecution in Šainović and Ojdanić, in support of its 
contention that the burden placed upon the accused in release 
determinations is a “very substantial” one.283 This interpretation 
of the Brđanin language is no doubt a plausible one; however, it 
was subsequently dispelled by Judge Hunt, who authored the 
cited words. According to Hunt, the “substantial burden” noted 
in Brđanin bears no legal import; it is “a reference only to the 
substantial difficulty [an accused] will have, by reason of the 
context within which the Tribunal is forced to operate, in 
satisfying a Trial Chamber that more probably than not he will 
appear.”284 
Somewhat startling, then, is Judge Shahabuddeen’s 
response, in a separate opinion in the same case: “It could be 
argued that the reference to . . . ‘a substantial burden of proof’, 
visualised only a test based on the balance of the probabilities, 
the gravity of the condition to appear for trial being taken into 
account in the workings of that test. But I am not persuaded.”285 
Rejecting Judge Hunt’s explanation and maintaining that the 
cited Brđanin language “went to the kind of standard of proof by 
which that ‘substantial burden of proof’ had to be discharged,” 
 
281. Prosecution’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision to Grant 
Provisional Release, ¶ 9, Sainović & Ojdanić (July 26, 2002). 
282. Prosecutor v. Brđanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by 
Radoslav Brđanin for Provisional Release, ¶ 18 (July 25, 2000). 
283. Šainović & Ojdanić, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 28 (Oct. 30, 2002) 
(Hunt, J., dissenting). 
284. Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added). According to Hunt, “[t]he more serious the matter 
asserted, or the more serious the consequences flowing from a particular finding, the 
greater the difficulty there will be in satisfying the relevant tribunal that what is asserted 
is more probably true than not.” Id. ¶ 29. 
285. Šainović & Ojdanić, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 40 (Shahabuddeen, J., 
separate opinion). 
  
1162 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1101 
Shahabuddeen sanctions the prosecution’s position and endorses 
the use of an intermediate standard.286 
This divide leaves the water rather muddied as regards the 
applicable standard of proof in release determinations. It appears 
that the majority of subsequent decisions that affirmatively 
address the issue of the standard of proof endorse Judge Hunt’s 
approach, averring that the applicable standard of proof is that 
of the balance of probabilities.287 Yet many release 
determinations fail to elaborate upon the standard imposed and 
others avail themselves of the now ambiguous assertion that the 
accused’s burden is a “substantial” one.288 Moreover, several 
decisions evidence outright approval of a heightened standard of 
proof in provisional release matters, as well as of Judge 
Shahabuddeen’s interpretation of the language in Brđanin.289 
Accordingly, this noted disparity as to what the standard is—or 
ought to be—provides yet another example of how parties to a 
provisional release motion at the ICTY face both unpredictable 
and potentially disparate treatment. 
Finally, one must also consider the standard of proof 
associated with the tacit prosecutorial burden addressed 
earlier.290 Despite the fact that it is often difficult to discern the 
standard employed in any given case (unless a court expressly 
addresses the issue), the substance of at least one tribunal 
decision raises concerns regarding the standard of proof 
required in matters in which the prosecution has an implied 
burden regarding the dangerousness prong. While seeming to 
 
286. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. 
287. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on 
Provisional Release, ¶ 37 (May 26, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milosević, Case No. IT-02-54T, 
Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 10 (Feb. 23, 2006); 
Prosecutor v. Perešić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Momčilo Perešić’s Motion for 
Provisional Release, ¶ 5(h) (June 9, 2005); Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-PT, 
Decision on Defence Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 4 (May 6, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Lazarević, Case No. IT-03-70-PT, Decision on Defence Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 
5(h) (Apr. 14, 2005). 
288. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Order on Provisional 
Release of Milivoj Petković, ¶ 13 (July 30, 2004). 
289. Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-04-80-PT, Decision Concerning Motion for 
Provisional Release of Milan Gvero, ¶ 8 (July 19, 2005); Tolimir, Decision Concerning 
Motion for Provisional Release of Radivoje Miletić, ¶ 8 (July 19, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-PT, Decision Concerning Renewed Motion 
for Provisional Release of Johan Tarčulovski, ¶ 9 (Jan. 17, 2007). 
290. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
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maintain the position that dangerousness cannot be established 
in abstracto, in deciding the pretrial fate of Lahi Brahimaj, Trial 
Chamber II accepted as sufficient virtually unchallengeable (and, 
consequently, unverifiable) evidence proffered by the 
prosecution.291 In so doing, the trial chamber asserted that the 
threshold upon the prosecution as regards the dangerousness 
prong “must not be set too high; else, it would never be met.”292 
This is a troubling conclusion in light of the fact that, as 
noted above, to associate an insignificant standard of proof with 
this prosecutorial onus is substandard: if the prosecution is 
deemed to meet its burden as to the potential dangerousness of 
an accused by proffering a negligible amount of “evidence,” this 
has the capacity to undermine the utility of the allocation from 
the standpoint of procedural fairness. If a trial chamber deems 
vague and unsubstantiated prosecutorial assertions as sufficient, 
the accused essentially remains in the same untenable position of 
establishing the universal proposition of nondangerousness (and, 
even more troublingly, may be required to establish the same in 
accord with Judge Shahabuddeen’s higher standard). 
E. Relevant Factors in Assessing Requests for Release 
1. General Considerations 
Having thus covered the matters of burden allocation and 
standards of proof, it makes sense to highlight those issues that 
may play a role in a chamber’s determination as to whether these 
requirements are satisified. As Rule 65 is silent regarding the 
factors that may be considered in granting or denying release, 
one must look to the jurisprudence of the tribunal to isolate 
some of the factors that may be relevant to a provisional release 
determination. In this regard, a non-exhaustive list composed by 
the Appeals Chamber in Šainović & Ojdanić in 2002 is quite 
useful.293 Among the factors noted therein are: the seriousness of 
 
291. The evidence at issue involved assertions of intimidation by two anonymous 
witnesses and a third allegation of interference contained in a sealed UNMIK file to 
which the accused was denied access. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, 
Further Decision on Brahimaj’s Motion (May 3, 2006). 
292. Id. ¶ 39 (concluding that “[t]his is particularly true in an environment which 
is hostile to witnesses who are willing to give evidence in criminal proceedings.”). 
293. Prosecutor v. Šainović & Ojdanić, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on 
Provisional Release (Oct. 30, 2002). 
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the criminal offense, the likelihood of a long prison term if 
convicted, the circumstances of surrender, the degree of 
cooperation given by the authorities of the state to which the 
accused seeks to be released, guarantees offered by the 
authorities of that state in relation to ensuring the presence of 
the accused for trial and the observance of the conditions set by a 
trial chamber, the senior position of the accused, the existence of 
national legislation facilitating cooperation with the tribunal, the 
degree to which the accused has cooperated with the 
prosecution, and any suggestion that the accused has interfered 
with justice since the confirmation of the indictment against 
him.294 
Despite the fact that the opinion seemingly limits its 
observations to the case then at issue,295 subsequent appellate 
jurisprudence appears to indicate otherwise296 and some 
subsequent decisions reflect this sentiment as well.297 As such, 
one cannot underestimate its precedential value for subsequent 
release determinations at the ICTY. Importantly, however, the list 
is not comprehensive and, of course, some of the items 
mentioned are more noteworthy than others. For example, while 
it is reasonable for the severity of the crimes charged and the 
consequent potential penalties to play a role in pretrial release 
decision making, given the limited subject matter jurisdiction of 
the tribunal, such inquiries will often yield similar results and 
therefore likely admit of an answer before the question is even 
posed. Among those factors that remain, however, an undeniably 
potent issue is that of state guarantees. 
 
294. Id. ¶ 6. 
295. Id. (noting that a reasonable trial chamber would have been expected to 
consider the above enumerated factors “[i]n relation to the present application for 
provisional release.” (emphasis added)). 
296. See, e.g., Sainović & Ojdanić, Decision Refusing Ojdanić Leave to Appeal, at 4 
(June 27, 2003) (noting that “in its Decision on Provisional Release, the Appeals 
Chamber has laid down a non-exhaustive list of factors which a Trial Chamber must take 
into account before granting provisional release.”). 
297. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-PT, Decision 
on Johan Tarčulovski‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 13 (July 18, 2005); Prosecutor 
v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Momčilo Perišić’s Motion for Provisional 
Release, at 2–3 (June 9, 2005). 
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2. State/Entity Guarantees 
Notwithstanding tribunal claims to the contrary,298 it has 
thus far been established that certain aspects of pretrial release at 
the ICTY, in particular, that detention is the rule and the accused 
bears the burden of proof as regards release, do not legitimately 
correspond with the tribunal’s so-called institutional 
shortcomings. By contrast, the relevance of state guarantees to 
release determinations genuinely addresses the ICTY’s lack of a 
police force, as the use of state guarantees create to the ability to 
monitor the accused while on release and to arrest him, if 
necessary.299 It follows, then, that an accused request that the 
state in which he intends to reside during his release provide 
assurances as to his return to the tribunal.300 
Although Rule 65 does not explicitly reference state 
guarantees, such assurances are extremely valuable. In fact, 
although tribunal case law has consistently maintained that a 
state guarantee is not a mandatory precondition for obtaining 
release,301 this contention does not seem to stand up to scrutiny. 
 
298. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
299. Indeed, ICTY former President Meron acknowledges that release “has been 
granted increasingly often as better government cooperation has made it possible to 
trust states’ guarantees to rearrest the accused.” Thoedor Meron, Anatomy of an 
International Criminal Tribunal: Hudson Lecture, 100 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. PROC. 279, 284 
(2006) (implying that it is the inability of ICTR indictees to obtain guarantees that has 
stalled provisional release motions at the ICTR). 
300. Here, the ICTY arguably finds itself in a different position from that of the 
ICC, as states parties to the ICC are obliged to “cooperate fully with the Court.” Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 86, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see 
also Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Interim Release of 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 85–87 (Aug. 14, 2009) (implying that the ICC may call 
upon unwilling states to implement its interim release decisions pursuant to their treaty 
obligations). But see Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA2, Judgment on the Appeal of 
the Prosecutor, ¶¶ 107 (Dec. 2, 2009) (maintaining that the ICC “is dependent on State 
cooperation in relation to accepting a person who has been conditionally released as 
well as ensuring that the conditions imposed by the Court are enforced. Without such 
cooperation, any decision of the Court granting conditional release would be 
ineffective”).  
301. See Sainović & Ojdanić, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 57 (Oct. 30, 2002) 
(Hunt, J., dissenting) (“The Appeals Chamber has made it clear that, although the 
production of a guarantee from the relevant governmental body is advisable, it is not a 
prerequisite for provisional release.” (citing Blagojević, Decision on Application by 
Dragan Jokić for Provisional Release, at 2–3 (Mar. 28, 2002)); see also Prosecutor v. 
Tolimir, Case No. IT-04-80-AR65.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial 
Chamber’s Decisions Granting Provisional Release, ¶ 9 (Oct. 19, 2005) (averring that 
Rule 65 “places no obligation upon an accused applying for provisional release to 
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As per appellate jurisprudence, the absence of a state guarantee 
“weighs heavily” against an accused seeking release.302 Moreover, 
as yet, not one accused has obtained release in the absence of 
such a guarantee.303 This aligns with the U.N. Secretary-General’s 
October 2000 report to the General Assembly which states “in 
those cases in which no guarantee is given by the relevant state, a 
release will not be granted.”304 In this respect, the jurisprudence 
of the ICTR appears more honest than its Yugoslav counterpart, 
in that it acknowledges that “[t]he Defence must provide at least 
prima facie evidence that the country in question agrees or 
would agree to accept the Accused on its territory, and that the 
country will guarantee the Accused’s return to the Tribunal at 
such times as the Chamber may order.”305 
The jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal makes clear that 
each provisional release application must be assessed individually 
and on its own facts.306 As a result, a state’s general level of 
 
provide guarantees from a State as a prerequisite to obtaining provisional release” 
(citations omitted)). 
302. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-AR65.2, Decision on Ljube 
Boškoski’s Interlocutory Appeal on Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Sept. 28, 2005) 
(maintaining, however, that “a lack of governmental guarantees does not alone bar 
provisional release”). 
303. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 181, at 225 (noting that, as of 2003, the ICTY 
required every released accused to secure a state guarantee despite the fact that “it is not 
a prerequisite to the grant of provisional release.”); see also, Clemens A. Muller, The Law 
of Interim Release in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals, 8 INT’L CRIM. L. 
REV. 589, 605 (2008) (observing that “[g]uarantees given by governments or authorities 
are essential in determining if the accused will appear for trial”). It is nothing short of 
ironic, then, that the tribunal’s hollow mantra—that a guarantee is not a prerequisite for 
release—is cited in the recent ICC Bemba decision in support of the single judge’s 
conclusion that release should be granted despite the absence of such a guarantee. 
Bemba, ¶ 88. 
304. Summary of Follow-up Action Taken to Implement Relevant 
Recommendations of the Internal and External Oversight Bodies and the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, The Secretary-General, Report of 
the Secretary General on the Financing of the ICTY, Annex VII, at 82, U.N. Doc. A/55/517 
(Oct. 24, 2000). 
305. Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-I, Decision on Defence 
Motion to Fix a Date for the Commencement of the Trial of Father Emmanuel Rukundo 
or, in the Alternative, to Request His Provisional Release, ¶ 22 (Aug. 18, 2003). This 
requirement is likely the key factor the ICTR’s failure to have ever granted a request for 
provisional release. 
306. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brđanin & Talić, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the 
Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talić (Sept. 20, 2002) (noting that 
Rule 65 “cannot be applied in abstracto, but must be applied with regard to the factual 
basis of the particular case”). 
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cooperation with the tribunal should not be referenced as a 
separate finding in an application;307 rather, the relevant issue is 
the merit of the guarantee vis-à-vis the relevant accused.308 
Undoubtedly, this is an approach that works to the advantage of 
an accused in possession of a guarantee from a state or entity that 
does not have a strong record with the tribunal. Of course, an 
accused in possession of a guarantee from an unpopular state or 
entity may well still face an uphill battle. 
Guarantees rendered by nonstate entities equally merit 
consideration in provisional release determinations. The 
Tribunal has accepted guarantees from the U.N. Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo309 and, more controversially, 
from the nonstate entity of Republika Srpska. Acceptance of 
guarantees from the latter was the result of a tug of war between 
Trial Chamber II and the appeals chamber, the former refusing 
to factor in a guarantee rendered by Republika Srpska in a 
release determination310 despite appellate jurisprudence 
dictating otherwise. Later, in direct contravention of a decision 
directing the lower court to consider the proffered guarantee, 
the trial chamber refused to relent.311 Consequently, when faced 
with the issue for a second time, the appeals chamber decided 
the matter on its own.312 
 
307. See Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case Nos. IT-02-60-AR65 & IT-02-60-AR65.2, 
Decision on Provisional Release of Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Obrenović, ¶ 12 (Oct. 
3, 2002) (Hunt, J., separate opinion). 
308. See Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-AR65.4, Decision on Provisional Release 
Application of Blagojević, ¶ 16 (Feb. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-
13/1-AR65, Decision on Appeal Against Refusal to Grant Provisional Release, ¶ 11 (Oct. 
8, 2002). 
309. See Gaynor, supra note 110, at 187. 
310. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Decision on Dragan Obrenović’s Application 
for Provisional Release, ¶ 2 (Nov. 19, 2002) (noting that the original decision to deny 
release “was independent of the guarantees provided by the authorities which gave 
them”). 
311. Blagojević, Case Nos. IT-02-60-AR65 & IT-02-60-AR65.2, Decision on Provisional 
Release of Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Obrenović, (Oct. 3, 2002) (Shahabuddeen, J., 
declaration). 
312. Blagojević, Decision on Provisional Release Application of Blagojević, ¶ 14. 
Although the relevant accused persons were unsuccessful, the same appellate panel 
granted the short-term release of another accused who proffered guarantees provided 
by Republika Srpska. See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Decision on 
Application for Provisional Release (Dec. 12, 2002). Notably, however, the motion by the 
accused was not opposed by the prosecution. Id. 
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F. Return of the Dangerousness Prong: Problems in Addition to 
Burden Allocation 
As already noted, Rule 65(B) requires that a trial chamber 
be satisfied that the accused will not pose a danger to any victim, 
witness, or other person upon release. Up to this point, the 
“dangerousness prong” has been established to be problematic 
with regard to both burden allocation and the standard of proof. 
However, these areas do not represent the whole of the 
difficulties associated with the provision. As will be shown, the 
dangerousness prong also unacceptably permits detention on the 
basis of an untried indictment313 and the broadness of the 
dangerousness provision compounds the proof problems of the 
accused beyond that of establishing a universal proposition. As 
Tribe observes, it is possible to live one’s life in a manner likely to 
assure never to be found guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt, yet the same cannot be said for the lesser standard of 
proof required to secure an indictment, nor the ability to ensure 
that one will never be deemed to pose a danger to any person.314 
Equally, when considering the dangerousness prong, it 
makes sense to recall the presumption of innocence. As noted 
earlier, in order for pretrial detention to comply with the 
presumption, the reason for detention must relate to the 
integrity of the trial process.315 Bearing this factor in mind, 
difficulties with the dangerousness prong immediately come to 
light. The provision is overly broad and by no means constrained 
so as to ensure solely the reliability of the judicial process,316 a 
fact that is indicated by the absence of any relevant language of 
limitation and established beyond a doubt by its inclusion of the 
language “or other person.” 
 
313. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 768 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“It is clear to me that a pending indictment may not be given any weight in evaluating 
an individual’s risk to the community or the need for immediate detention.”). 
314. Tribe, supra note 80, at 405–06. 
315. See supra Part I.B.2. 
316.  ICTY Rules, supra 179, R.65(B). As is illustrated infra Part III.G.2, this problem 
extends beyond the dangerousness prong in Rule 65(B), as certain trial chambers have 
asserted that their discretionary authority enables them to detain an accused if required 
by the public interest. 
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In addition, the sheer punitive aspect of this type of 
detention317 affronts the presumption of innocence318 and, by 
enabling the detention of an individual based upon his potential 
to pose a danger to others, the provision is as arbitrary as it is 
unfair. While individuals who stand accused may be more likely, 
on the whole to commit a future crime, “there are persons not 
charged with any crime who give every indication of being at least 
as dangerous as anyone awaiting trial on a pending charge.”319 
Furthermore, when viewed in the light of a subsequent 
acquittal, the dangerousness prong again proves both in violation 
of the presumption of innocence and inconsistent in its 
application.320 Once cleared of the underlying charges, a 
“dangerous” accused will be released into the community,321 
 
317. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
aff’d sub nom. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F. 2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
If incarceration . . . were based exclusively on a founded suspicion that [an 
individual] had committed crimes, no one would doubt that this constituted 
punishment. To hold that it is not ‘punishment’ when based on a vague 
suspicion the [individual] may commit further crimes would render the due 
process clause in inverse proportion to the arbitrariness of governmental 
decision-making. 
Id. 
318. See, e.g., Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 
75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 373 (1990) (concluding that, under such circumstances, a court’s 
finding that an accused will commit crimes in the future “is equivalent to guilt after 
trial—that the individual possesses the requisite mens rea to justify being jailed”). 
319. Tribe, supra note 80, at 405. 
320. This is again an area where domestic practice by no means represents best 
practice. As is reflected by the Salerno dissents noted supra, the United States Bail 
Reform Act also allows for the detention of a “dangerous” accused. See, e.g., United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 768 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, the 
amendment of the Irish Constitution, supra note 16, paved the way for that country to 
refuse bail when it is “reasonably considered necessary to prevent the commission of a 
serious offence by” an accused. See Bail Act, 1997, §2(1) (Act. No. 16/1997) (Ir.) 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0016/
sec0002.html#zza16y1997s2. The relevant amendment to the constitution required a 
public referendum in which it garnered the approval of 74.83% of voters, see Ireland 
Index, History and News, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ei__indx.html 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2010), a result that provides credence to the theory that the present 
trend is for members of voting communities to endorse the erosion of civil liberties in 
favor of provisions that enhance their “security.” See Ireland Index, History and News, 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ei__indx.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2010). 
321. Justice Marshall concludes that this is the case in the United States, where the 
detention provision requires the government to establish dangerousness by clear and 
convincing evidence, as this fails to meet the reasonable doubt threshold required to 
imprison an individual for a crime. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 756 n. 1, 763–64 (1987) 
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despite the fact that his dangerousness may have had nothing to 
do with the integrity of the criminal process in the case at hand 
and, therefore, he may be as likely to endanger others at the 
moment as before acquittal. Indeed, only those bases used to 
establish the necessity of pretrial detention that relate to the 
integrity of the pending case cease to exist upon acquittal.322 
Moreover, the release of the accused highlights the fact that, 
impermissibly, it was the underlying charge(s), to which the 
presumption of innocence never ceased to apply, which enabled 
the pretrial detention. Stated succinctly, “[t]he conclusion is 
inescapable that the indictment has been turned into evidence, if 
not that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, then that, 
left to his own devices, he will soon be guilty of something 
else.”323 
G. Rule 65: Breadth and Vagueness Problems 
The breadth problems associated with rule 65(B) are, 
unfortunately, not limited to the dangerousness prong, but also 
arise in conjunction with the trial chamber’s discretionary power 
in provisional release matters. ICTY jurisprudence provides that a 
chamber has the power to deny a motion for provisional release 
despite the fact that an accused has proved that he will reappear 
for trial and will not pose a danger to any person if released.324 A 
plain reading of Rule 65(B) reveals that this discretionary power 
may not equally be used to grant release when a trial chamber is 
not satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and/or that he 
will not pose a danger to any person if released—and this is 
 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). This argument is even stronger at the tribunal where, as 
discussed supra, the accused ostensibly bears the burden of disproving his dangerousness 
and, even in cases where the prosecution seems to carry the affirmative burden, the 
standard of proof may be minimal. 
322. Tribe, supra note 80, at 406. 
323. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 764 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
324. Trial Chamber II quibbles with this assertion. It maintains that “if a Trial 
Chamber is satisfied regarding [the] two preconditions, the Chamber must then 
determine whether it should exercise its discretion to order release.” Prosecutor v. 
Tolimir, Case No. IT-04-80-PT, Decision Concerning Motion for Provisional Release of 
Milan Gvero, ¶ 8 (July 19, 2005) (emphasis added). A contrary view, and an argument 
for a shared or shifting burden, has been advanced by Judge Hunt. Prosecutor v. 
Šainović & Ojdanić, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 80 (Oct. 
30, 2002) (Hunt, J., dissenting) (averring that, once an accused has established that he 
will appear for trial and will not be a danger to others while on release, release ought to 
be granted, unless the prosecution persuades the chamber against it). 
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confirmed in ICTY case law.325 Yet there is no statutory guidance 
as to the application of the discretionary power in denying 
release when the express requirements have been met.326 Thus, 
the state of affairs is such that the deciding trial chamber is not 
perceptively restrained in rejecting a motion for release.327 In 
short, an accused may carry his burden, yet remain in detention 
due to factors that are both unarticulated and limitless. As such, 
it is submitted that, insofar as it confers this discretionary power 
upon the trial chamber, Rule 65 is impermissibly vague. 
1. Dangerousness Prong 
Admittedly, if one were to apply the “void for vagueness” 
doctrine familiar in U.S. jurisprudence, one might anticipate 
certain difficulties, as historically the doctrine in the United 
States has turned on whether a law provides adequate notice as to 
the type of conduct it prohibits (akin to nulla poena sine lege).328 
 
325. Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional 
Release, ¶ 21 (Feb. 20, 2002) (“If the Trial Chamber is not convinced that the accused 
will both appear for trial and not pose a risk to any victim, witness or other person, a 
request for provisional release must be denied.” (emphasis added)). 
326. Trial Chamber I has attempted to shed some light on this issue, noting that: 
[T]he express requirements within Rule 65(B) should not be construed as 
intending to exhaustively list the reasons why release should be refused in a 
given case. There may be evidence of obstructive behaviour other than 
absconding or interfering with witnesses, which a Trial Chamber finds 
necessary to take into account. For example: the destruction of documentary 
evidence; the effacement of traces of alleged crimes; and potential conspiracy 
with co-accused who are at large. In addition, factors such as the proximity of a 
prospective judgement date or start of the trial may weigh against a decision to 
release. The public interest may also require the detention of the accused 
under certain circumstances, if there are serious reasons to believe that he or 
she would commit further serious offences. 
Id. ¶ 22. Of course, the last issue noted rejects the broad and positive application of the 
presumption of innocence called for herein and arguably sanctions preventative 
detention. See supra Part I.B.2. 
327. In this regard, it is worthwhile to recall Nowak’s admonition, noted at the 
outset of this Article: in order to guard against arbitrary and unjust detention, relevant 
legislation must “define precisely the cases in which deprivation of liberty is permissible.” 
NOWAK, supra note 27, at 211–12 (emphasis added). 
328. See David W. Gartenstein & Joseph F. Weingartz, RICO’s “Pattern” Requirement: 
Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 504–05 (1990). A domestic analogy is 
necessary here, as “an international void for vagueness doctrine has never been fully 
articulated.” Matthew C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 79, 99 (2006). This absence in international law is perhaps best 
attributed to the nascent aspect of international criminal proceedings. The vagueness 
doctrine, while not limited to criminal prohibitions and sanctions, “has shown greater 
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In fact, in addressing a challenge to the “dangerousness” 
component in the U.S. Bail Reform Act based upon this ground, 
the district court in the Payden case rejected the claim, averring 
that the bail statute does not prohibit conduct, and asserted that 
“rather it establishes a framework for a judge to detain an 
individual based on a prediction of possible future conduct.”329 
Yet, with regard to the dangerousness claim, there is merit to the 
argument that both the U.S. act and the ICTY RPE “fail[] to give 
notice of the conduct which will lead to pre-trial detention.”330 
Moreover, one must again consider the burden of proof 
problems earlier associated with universal propositions in light of 
the fact that “[t]he core of procedural due process is the 
adequacy of the hearing provided before a deprivation of liberty 
. . . occurs.”331 
Further still, it appears that the Payden court fatally 
overlooked the evolution of the vagueness doctrine. Over time, 
the notice requirement has inherited a twin element, as the 
prevention of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of law 
has become “an independent wing” of the doctrine.332 In fact, it 
is this latter component that has been dubbed the “most 
persuasive justification for vagueness review generally.”333 Thus, 
as is illustrated in Canadian jurisprudence, a vagueness attack 
may be structured in one of these two ways.334 
2. Tribunal’s Discretionary Power 
In fact, the Canadian Supreme Court somewhat recently 
entertained a legality challenge to a bail provision in the 
country’s criminal code on the basis that its language facilitated 
 
solicitude for the protection of the individual who faces criminal penalties.” Gartenstein 
& Weingartz, supra, at 509. 
329. United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1396 (S.D.N.Y 1984). 
330. Id. at 1395 (citing the defendant’s claim). 
331. Aime v. Commonwealth, 611 N.E. 2d 204, 214 (Mass. 1993). 
332. Gartenstein & Weingartz, supra note 328, at 513–16 (noting that this 
component has come to be known as the “primary goal” of the doctrine). 
333. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 
71 VA. L. REV. 189, 218 (1985). 
334. A claim of vagueness may be waged pursuant to the Canadian Charter under 
either section 1 (nulla poena sine lege) or section 7 (the dictate of fundamental justice 
that laws may not be too vague). See, e.g., Canada v. Nova Scotia Pharm. Soc’y, [1992] 2 
S.C.R. 606 (Can.).  
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arbitrary detention. The wording at issue in R. v. Hall335 enabled 
judicial officials to deny bail “on any just cause being shown and, 
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, where the 
detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the 
administration of justice . . . .”336 While upholding the 
“administration of justice” language, the majority decision 
rejected the preceding phrase of “any just cause” declaring that 
“it is a fundamental principle of justice that an individual cannot 
be detained by virtue of a vague legal provision.”337 As noted by 
the dissenting members of the court, in finding the provision 
offensive in its entirety, “sweeping discretion to abrogate the 
liberty of the accused” is unjustifiable.338 In addition, the dissent 
convincingly highlights the need for applying the vagueness 
doctrine to the judiciary, noting: “A standardless sweep does not 
become more acceptable simply because it results from the 
whims of judges and justices of the peace rather than the whims 
of law enforcement officials. Cloaking whims in judicial robes is 
not sufficient to satisfy the principles of fundamental justice.”339 
Considering these conclusions alongside the unfettered 
discretion that the ICTY judiciary has granted itself in matters of 
provisional release thus creates a worrisome picture indeed. In 
this respect, the judges have truly made themselves the 
unrestrained masters of an accused person’s destiny by “failing to 
give direction as to how to exercise [their] discretion, so that this 
exercise may be controlled.”340 Furthermore, in the absence of 
an articulated and intelligible standard, the tribunal’s “adversary 
system . . . [may] suffer[] because its vitality depends on effective 
challenge.”341 
One final matter merits mention before concluding this 
discussion of the discretionary release powers of the tribunal. 
 
335. [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, [96] (Can.). 
336. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, ch. C 46, §515 (10)(c) (1985) (amended 
2003). The two preceding subsections provide for detention when necessary to secure 
presence at trial and where necessary for the protection or safety of the public, 
respectively. Id. § 515 (10)(a)–(b). 
337. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [12]. 
338. Id. [51]. 
339. Id. [73] (Iacobucci, J., dissenting) (citing R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, 
729 (Can.)). 
340. R. v. Nova Scotia Pharm. Soc’y, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, 641. 
341. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [59] (quoting H.L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION 214–15 (1968)). 
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Similar to the express requirements in Rule 65(B), the Canadian 
Criminal Code provides, in addition to the litigated section, that 
an accused may be detained where necessary to secure his 
presence at trial and, alternatively, for the protection or safety of 
the public.342 Accordingly, the dissent in R. v. Hall fairly 
questions whether any acceptable, additional purpose could be 
served by reserving a catch-all discretionary power.343 In assessing 
the matter, the dissent rightly concludes that providing for 
detention in matters in which there is no risk of flight and in 
which there is no safety threat would actually serve to undermine 
confidence in the administration of justice.344 As a consequence, 
the power is ripe for misuse and is likely intended to detain an 
accused solely in satisfaction of the will of the public.345 
To be fair, the Canadian provision is slightly more 
descriptive than Rule 65(B), in that its protection of the public 
clause relates to those acts by an accused that may constitute an 
interference with the administration of justice.346 In this regard, 
the tribunal’s rule is lacking. Accordingly, the concerns raised by 
the Hall minority with regard to discretionary power ring equally 
true at the ICTY. As such, the retention of the unbridled 
discretionary power at the tribunal creates the possibility that 
impermissible considerations make affect release determinations. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of provisional release involves a complex array 
of interrelated issues. Involved in the mix are liberty interests, 
which give rise to the exceptional nature of detention, the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention, and the right to be presumed 
innocent. As the latter concept has evolved, it has expanded 
beyond a rule of evidence that dictates the burden of proof in 
criminal trials, and is now predominantly viewed as a necessary 
element at each stage of the criminal process. Thus, the 
presumption has garnered a role at center stage, as the raison 
d’être of pretrial release347 and, in conjunction with the right to 
 
342. Canada Criminal Code § 515 (10)(a)–(b). 
343. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [96] (Iacobucci, J., dissenting). 
344. Id. [101]. 
345. See id. [106]. 
346. See Canada Criminal Code § 515 (10)(b). 
347. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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liberty, dictates that instances of pretrial detention ought to be 
limited to those factors relevant to the pretrial process. 
Accordingly, the right to liberty is indeed subject to 
limitation. However, in such instances, the necessary safeguard to 
which an accused is entitled is the opportunity for effective 
judicial review of detention. This element ensures the integrity of 
the criminal process and appropriate respect for the liberty 
interests of the accused. As a result, despite the severity of the 
crimes under the ICTY’s jurisdiction, an absolute ban on the 
right to release for those who stand accused before it would not 
have complied with its responsibility to either the accused or the 
world at large. This is a pivotal issue: had it not been incumbent 
upon the tribunal to ensure effective judicial supervision of the 
deprivations of liberty it authorized, it would not be possible to 
be critical of the release system that was ultimately adopted other 
than by considering its limitations as effective precedent. While 
the tribunal continues to take small steps toward bringing its 
provisional release scheme closer in line with international 
human rights norms, its progress is inconsistent and suffers from 
a lack of candor, severely hampering the value of tribunal 
precedent. 
The tribunal’s allocation of the burden of proof is one of its 
primary shortcomings. Inefficiency concerns aside, it is the 
fundamental right of every human being to be free from 
arbitrary detention, and a system that requires an accused to 
prove that his detention is arbitrary, rather than require the 
detaining authority to establish the reasonableness and necessity 
of limiting the right to liberty is a backwards one indeed. 
Moreover, the very basis of the rules governing burden 
allocation, that assignment be fair in a given situation, is 
offended by the tribunal’s requirement that an accused establish 
the universal (and future) proposition of non-dangerousness.  
Importantly, the tribunal’s approach in this or in others 
areas that represent incompatibility with international human 
rights norms is not elevated by the fact that it is reflected in the 
practice of some states. As a U.N. entity, the ICTY ought to be 
stemming the tide of the erosion of civil liberties, not creating 
precedent unworthy of imitation by descending into a 
netherworld where such rights may be sidelined in order to curry 
favor with external entities. Indeed, the fact that tribunal’s 
  
1176 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1101 
approach has given rise to the argument at the ECCC that a 
Cambodian procedural rule—which comports with 
internationally accepted standards with regard to its view of 
detention—should possibly give way to ICTY practice, creates a 
very troubling picture. 
Additional problems are bound to arise with regard to 
precedent and burden allocation. While, positively, the tribunal 
appears to have recognized the unfairness of an accused-based 
burden as to future dangerousness, its refusal to affirmatively 
acknowledge this fact encourages disparate treatment of its 
accused and is wholly unhelpful in terms of guidance to future 
courts. What is the value of reams of case-law maintaining an 
entirely accused-based burden of proof when, in fact, tribunal 
practice reveals a sometimes tacit prosecutorial burden in release 
matters? 
In addition, the tribunal’s rationale for its assignment of the 
burden of proof is at best misguided and at worst disingenuous. 
In fact, the only aspect of the tribunal’s provisional release 
practice that actually addresses its institutional shortcomings is its 
requirement of state/entity guarantees. To assert otherwise is 
simply illogical, leaving one to wonder whether the assignment of 
the burden actually turns on the fact that an accused-based 
allocation of proof makes life easier for the prosecution or, 
alternatively, makes release that much more difficult for an 
accused to obtain. 
Equally problematic are the overly broad dangerousness 
prong and the unfettered discretion retained by the tribunal to 
reject release applications. In a certain respect, each undermines 
the ability of an accused to determine his fate and to avoid the 
punishment of detention. Further problems abound, such as 
arbitrary and unfair determinations to detain and a lack of 
respect for the presumption of innocence. Moreover, the 
tribunal’s discretionary power ought to be void for vagueness; it 
leaves the judiciary able to act without direction and fails to focus 
the release inquiry by providing an intelligible standard to which 
both the accused and the prosecution may respond. Finally, it 
again leaves members of a trial chamber free to entertain notions 
that ought not to be part of the judicial inquiry. 
Ultimately, tribunal practice and its precedential value 
would be enhanced by requiring a level of certainty in its 
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procedure such that parties could adequately prepare for and 
argue motions. Similarly, there is a need to establish uniformity 
as to issues in dispute, in order to ensure that like cases are 
indeed treated alike and that there is meaning and substance to 
the language that appears in tribunal decisions. Finally, and of 
distinct significance, as accused persons bear the brunt of the 
tribunal’s lack of resources insofar as provisional release 
determinations are concerned, the judiciary ought to ensure that 
any steps departing from international norms are directly, 
genuinely, and clearly attributable to the context in which the 
tribunal operates. 
